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I. ABSTRACT
Technological innovation in finance (“FinTech”) has been on the rise 
in recent years, creating new challenges for regulators. These challenges
vary significantly depending on the region in question and type of economy,
not least because different technologies are applied to tackle different 
problems. This Article focuses on regulatory frameworks of two leading
jurisdictions in terms of FinTech development in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
Kenya and South Africa. As the developments in the region cannot be 
analyzed in isolation from the global trends in FinTech regulation, this Article
approaches the matter systematically. It starts by clarifying the existing 
terminology and preparing a comprehensive matrix of various challenges 
in FinTech regulation: in doing so, it does not take the interests of innovation
promotion for granted and adopts a balanced approach, weighing
various—often mutually exclusive—considerations against each other. This
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Article also argues that rule of law challenges, rather than technical
problems, remain the key obstacles to adequate FinTech regulation. It then
proceeds to discuss the specific regulatory issues in two African 
jurisdictions that are current regional leaders in the FinTech space—Kenya
and South Africa. Finally, this Article concludes by synthesizing a set of
recommendations for improving the FinTech regulatory systems in the 
two countries, in the light of the earlier matrix of regulatory challenges. 
Many findings in this Article (such as the need for improved methodology
of social and economic impact analyses and various policy considerations for
structuring the FinTech regulation) are relevant outside the African context 
and have universal application.
II. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, FinTech has become a popular catch-all term for
technology-enabled financial solutions like cryptocurrencies, mobile money
or online lending platforms. FinTech’s distinguishing features include:
(1) the different (technology-based) nature and speed of innovation,
(2) disintermediation and disruption of traditional methods of delivery of 
financial services, (3) convergence of various (e.g. financial and
telecommunications) industries, (4) relatively low costs and barriers to 
entry, and (5) borderless operation and ability to cross national boundaries 
with ease.1 
The amount of global investment in FinTech has been growing rapidly 
in recent years. A recent report suggests that already more than 50% of all 
customers globally are using at least one FinTech firm.2 The overall 
volume of investments in FinTech fluctuates (it dropped from USD 46.7 
billion in 2015 to USD 24.7 billion in 2016,3 then rose to USD 31 billion 
in 20174), but remains significant. Over the last four years, the compound 
1. See Chris Brummer & Daniel Gorfine, FinTech: Building a 21st-Century
Regulator’s Toolkit, MILKEN INSTITUTE CENTER FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS 4–6 (Oct., 
2014), http://assets1b.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/Viewpoint/PDF/3.14-FinTech-Reg-
Toolkit-NEW.pdf [https://perma.cc/W5F9-H344].
2. World FinTech Report 2017, CAPGEMINI & LINKEDIN 12 (2017), https://www. 
capgemini.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/world_fintech_report_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
U7DK-SECZ].
3. The Pulse of FinTech Q4 2016: Global Analysis of Investment in Fintech, KPMG 4
(2017), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2017/02/pulse-of-fintech-q4­
2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/CB8P-Z82N].
4. The Pulse of FinTech Q4 2017: Global Analysis of Investment in Fintech, 
KPMG 5 (2018), https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2018/02/pulse_of_fintech
_q4_2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/D92Y-BWDS]. 
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annual growth rate of funding of FinTech start-ups alone exceeded 40%, 
reaching over USD 40 billion in cumulative investment.5 
FinTech, like any new financial, technological and legal reality, is inherently 
disruptive for any system of law. In many cases, it does not fit easily into 
the existing regulatory framework and challenges the regulators to produce
an appropriate response. The adequacy and timeliness of such legal response 
determine not only the viability of the FinTech solution, but also its potential
impact and capacity to contribute to positive social change. Quite often,
however, regulatory feedback to financial innovation is incomprehensible, 
inconsistent or comes too late.
As a result, the development of adequate FinTech-specific rules has
become a challenge for regulators all over the world, with widely differing
approaches across jurisdictions. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the new technologies, 
like mobile money, have greatly improved the levels of financial inclusion,
reducing the proportion of the unbanked population.6 At the same time, 
while FinTech presents new opportunities, the number of highly successful 
FinTech businesses across the region remains low. In addition, new
technologies are not adopted evenly. The same FinTech solution may struggle 
to achieve sufficient local demand in some jurisdictions (e.g. Vodacom’s 
and MTN’s mobile money platforms in South Africa), while gaining
overwhelming support in others (e.g. Safaricom’s M-Pesa in Kenya). 
A full-scale analysis of the complex matter of FinTech regulation across
Sub-Saharan Africa in a single paper would be unrealistic. Therefore, this
Article will focus on the regulatory frameworks of two leading jurisdictions
in terms of FinTech development in the region: Kenya and South Africa. 
However, the developments in these two countries cannot be analyzed in 
isolation from the global trends in FinTech regulation. This Article’s 
objectives are thus threefold: (1) to identify the types of challenges faced
by regulators around the world in addressing FinTech, (2) to examine the 
FinTech regulatory frameworks in Kenya and South Africa, revealing the 
challenges specific to these jurisdictions, and (3) to suggest practical
recommendations for the development of these frameworks. 
5. Redrawing the Lines: FinTech’s Growing Influence on Financial Services: Global
FinTech Report 2017, PWC 3 (2017), https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industries/financial­
services/assets/pwc-global-fintech-report-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/329R-B7MM]. 
6. See Nick Hughes & Susie Lonie, M-PESA: Mobile Money for the “Unbanked” 
Turning Cellphones into 24-Hour Tellers in Kenya, 2 INNOVATIONS: TECH., GOVERNANCE,
GLOBALIZATION, no. 1–2 63, 63 (2007). 
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The research of this Article is based on the analysis of existing literature 
on the subject, as well as interviews and roundtable discussions with
various stakeholders in the FinTech space in Kenya and South Africa.7 
This study is supported and informed by the most recent developments in
the area of FinTech regulation in Africa and across the globe, including 
reports and studies produced in 2017 and early 2018. While the overall 
focus is on the regulation in Kenya and South Africa due to their leading 
status as FinTech centers in Sub-Saharan Africa, this Article does tackle 
a number of relevant issues outside that region. The general issues addressed 
in this Article include: (1) a discussion on the meaning of FinTech in Part 
IV, (2) the analysis of various challenges in FinTech regulation, with a 
particular focus on rule of law issues, in Part V, (3) the list of global trends 
in FinTech regulation in Part VI, and (4) several of the suggestions in Part 
VII. 
In this Article, “regulation” is understood in the broad sense as formal 
and binding rules made by a government or other authority (whether 
domestic or international) in order to control the way something is done, 
or the way people behave. This definition implies that “regulators” are not
limited to governmental offices, departments and agencies, but also
include legislatures and, where sufficient authority has been transferred to 
a supranational level, the duly authorized international bodies. At the same
time, the reference to “formal and binding” rules means that any informal 
regulatory measures (such as industry self-regulation or market forces and
customs) are excluded. Consequently, entities that lack the power to issue 
binding rules (such as non-governmental international organizations) are 
not considered “regulators” for the purposes of this Article. 
In light of the objectives and methods discussed above, the remainder
of this Article is structured as follows. Part IV provides an overview of 
the concept of FinTech and discusses the feasibility of developing 
dedicated FinTech-specific regulation. Part V outlines the key approaches to 
FinTech regulation and summarizes the main underlying challenges. Part 
VI lists the current global developments in the regulation of FinTech. Part 
VII contains a more detailed discussion of the various challenges and 
trends in the regulation of FinTech in Sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on
Kenya and South Africa, and suggests a number of measures that can be
7. This Article does not contain a comprehensive overview of the FinTech regulation
in the selected jurisdictions. Rather, the highlighted challenges and regulatory instruments 
were selected as illustrative examples based on our discussions with the various stakeholders
and the analysis of existing literature.
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used to improve the existing legal regime. The Conclusion contains some 
general observations from the conducted research. 
IV. THE MEANING OF FINTECH
A. What is FinTech? 
The financial services sector is a common adopter of new technologies. 
However, the understanding of what can be characterized as “new technology”
has significantly changed over time. In the nineteenth century, the telegraph 
and the underwater transatlantic cables created the critical infrastructure 
for global financial communications, while half a century ago the introduction 
of automatic teller machines (“ATMs”) revolutionized some routine bank 
processes.8 Technological innovation is not a recent development in the
world of finance.9 
The term “FinTech”, on the contrary, is relatively new: some authors trace
its origins back to the 1990s,10 while others have found references to this
word as early as 1972.11 Despite its common use in the modern world of
finance, FinTech12 as a concept has not been uniformly understood. Over 
the recent years, different interpretations have attempted to capture its meaning. 
One popular approach is to broadly define FinTech as a form of integration 
of technology into the area of financial services.13 However, since such 
8. Douglas W. Arner, Jànos Barberis & Ross P. Buckley, The Evolution of FinTech: A
New Post-Crisis Paradigm, 47 GEO. J. INT’L. L. 1271, 1274 (2016). 
9. Some authors view the term “technology” broadly and include even the introduction 
of the first currency and writing materials. See, e.g., Brian Knight, FinTech: Who Regulates It
and Why It Matters, MILKEN INSTITUTE CENTER FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS 1 (Apr. 2016), 
http://assets1c.milkeninstitute.org/assets/Publication/Viewpoint/PDF/FinTech-Who­
Regulates-It-and-Why-It-Matters2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WZR-MBL4]. According to this
approach, the history of integration of technology in finance counts several millennia. 
10.  Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 8, at 1272. 
11. In a 1972 article by Abraham Leon Bettinger FinTech was defined as “an acronym 
which stands for financial technology, combining bank expertise with modern management
science techniques and the computer.” See Patrick Schueffel, Taming the Beast: A Scientific
Definition of Fintech, 4 J. INNOVATION MGMT. 32, 36 (2016). 
12. Similar terms have been developed to refer to the various applications of
technology in other sectors: HealthTech, InsurTech, RegTech, etc. 
13. According to a study by the World Economic Forum, FinTech refers to “companies
that provide or facilitate financial services by using technology.” See  WORLD ECON.
FORUM, The Future of FinTech: A Paradigm Shift in Small Business Finance 10 (Oct. 2015),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/IP/2015/FS/GAC15_The_Future_of_FinTech_Paradigm
_Shift_Small_Business_Finance_report_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PD6-CGPV]. Koffi
describes FinTech as “intersection between finance and technology.” See Hua Wiflried 
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integration has existed in one form or another for at least 150 years, FinTech 
could refer to any application of technology to finance, from telegraphic 
transmissions to virtual currencies.14 FinTech is commonly used today to
refer to the more recent technological advancements in finance, such as
online peer-to-peer lending platforms or automated robo-advisory15 services; 
therefore, this definition might be overly inclusive. 
Another approach is to give the term a more specific meaning in an attempt 
to avoid confusion—for example, by reference to the “innovative” or
“disruptive” effects or application of the new technology.16 In this capacity, 
Serge Koffi, The Fintech Revolution: An Opportunity for the West African Financial Sector, 6
OPEN J.APPLIEDSCI. 772. Arner, Barberis and Buckley similarly define FinTech as “application 
of technology to finance.” See Arner, Barberis & Buckley, supra note 8, at 1274. 
14. In its report on virtual currency schemes, the European Central Bank (“ECB”)
defines virtual currencies as “a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually
controlled by its developers, and used and accepted among the members of a specific
virtual community.” See EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 13 (2012), 
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/C6JG-XA74]. In 2015, the ECB revised its approach by getting rid of the word “money” as
well as references to the “unregulated” status and defined virtual currencies differently, as 
“a digital representation of value, not issued by a central bank, credit institution or e-money
institution, which, in some circumstances, can be used as an alternative to money.” See 
EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES: A FURTHER ANALYSIS 25 (2015),
https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemesen.pdf [https://perma.cc/
5WTU-NJ6Q].
15. Robo-advisory services are automated investment advisory (portfolio management) 
services operating with little or no human intervention. See The Rise of Robo-Advice: 
Changing the Concept of Wealth Management, ACCENTURE, https://www.accenture.com/ 
_acnmedia/PDF-2/Accenture-Wealth-Management-Rise-of-Robo-Advice.pdf [https://perma.
cc/39F5- 5RRC]; Robo-Advisors: The Rise of Automated Financial Advice, IPSOS (July
2017), https://www.ipsos.com/sites/default/files/2017-07/IpsosMarketing_POV_Robo
Advisors.pdf [https://perma.cc/659A-5RYQ]. In a recent study the mechanics of a robo­
advisory service were described as follows: “once you enroll for the service, you enter your risk
profile and, using advanced algorithms, the platform offers alternative personalized investment
portfolios for you to choose from . . . and continues to rebalance your portfolio as required . . .
digitally (online or mobile), without you having to talk to a live person.” See Hype vs. Reality: 
The Coming Waves of “Robo” Adoption, A.T. KEARNEY 2 (2005), https://www.atkearney.co.uk/
financial-institutions/robo-advisory-services-study [https://perma.cc/558J-7TSR]. 
16. Bunea, Kogan and Stolin refer to FinTech as a “shorthand for technological 
innovations in finance and/or for the business sector comprised of firms that enable such 
innovations.” See Sinziana Bunea, Benjamin Kogan & David Stolin, Banks Versus FinTech:
At Last, It’s Official, SLIDESHARE 3, https://www.slideshare.net/AlexanderJarvis/banks­
vs-fintech-at-last-its-official [https://perma.cc/GN3Z-7HG3]. According to Lee and Teo,
“FinTech refers to innovative financial services or products delivered via new technology.” See
David Lee Kuo Chuen & Ernie G.S. Teo, Emergence of FinTech and the LASIC Principles, 3
J. FIN. PERSPECTIVES: FINTECH 2, 4, (2015), https://fsinsights.ey.com/dam/jcr:a64c713c­
7bb9-42bd-ba45-afafcb1fe103/emergence-of-fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/F6YS-JJSM].
Philippon states that “FinTech covers digital innovations and technology-enabled business 
model innovations in the financial sector.” See Thomas Philippon, The FinTech Opportunity 2 
(July 2016), http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~tphilipp/papers/FinTech.pdf [https://perma.cc/
E2J2- ZSB6].
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FinTech stands for technologies which add novelty to the existing financing
instruments and processes. This implies a certain qualitative difference
between the “old” financing models and products on the one hand, and the
“new” solutions resulting from the application of technology on the other.
This approach is also problematic, however, since the solutions labelled 
as “old” will not always be the same in all jurisdictions and will vary depending 
on the period in question. It is also unclear which technological solutions are
deemed “innovative” enough to fall into the FinTech category, since novelty
is a relative criterion. 
The problem of defining FinTech has recently formed the basis of a 
dedicated study, which revealed the lack of a common understanding of
this term even at a basic conceptual level; various sources refer to it as a
sector, an industry, a technology, a business or a set of activities.17 This 
study produced the following generic formula based on the synthesis of 
commonalities in the other existing definitions: “Fintech [sic] is a new
financial industry that applies technology to improve financial activities.”18 
Although this definition attempts to consolidate the different approaches 
into one, it—just like the other existing definitions—remains rather 
vague; it is unclear what exactly makes FinTech an industry, what can be
considered an “improvement” in financial activities, or even what is a
“financial activity.”
B. Introduction to FinTech Regulation
However defined, FinTech forms part of the financial services sector— 
an area that has traditionally attracted significant regulatory attention and 
is often associated with comprehensive regulatory oversight. Despite this,
regulators across the globe are increasingly developing new approaches
to tackle FinTech. While a “hands-off” tactic is certainly possible, several
reasons justify the creation of FinTech-specific rules:
 17. Schueffel, supra note 11, at 45. 
18. Id.
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1.	 Existing regulatory regimes often do not support the new FinTech 
products and business models. For example, distributed ledger
technology (“DLT”)19 may be used by the financial services 
providers not only to enhance existing internal processes (in which 
case the regulatory implications might be minimal), but also to
change or replace the overall set-up of market participants and 
infrastructures, creating entirely new risks;20 
2.	 FinTech solutions allow easy access to financial services to 
unsophisticated parties who may require additional protection 
(e.g. investments and transactions in virtual currencies);21 
3.	 Regulators need to develop new (and alter the existing) regulatory
approaches to cope with the fast-paced developments in the 
financial services sector resulting from FinTech (e.g. in case of
rapid growth of online lending platforms);22 
4.	 FinTech may decentralize, disintermediate, and, to a certain degree,
anonymize the delivery of financial services, which may force 
some regulators to develop new ways of exercising “domestic” 
19. DLT is a technology based on records (“ledgers”) of electronic transactions kept 
in a shared, i.e., decentralized (“distributed”), network of participants and utilizing computer- 
based encryption techniques. See ESMA, Report: The Distributed Ledger Technology Applied to
Securities Markets 4 (2017), https://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files_force/library/dlt_
report_-_esma50-1121423017-285.pdf [https://perma.cc/KAQ2-EE8A]. 
20. Id. at 5, 18. 
21. As explained in a recent report by the UK Financial Markets Law Committee 
(“FMLC”), “[v]irtual currency transactions, owing to their technological nature, are irreversible 
and offer no legal protections for consumers against human error.” Consequently, consumers “do
not have the benefit of the most common forms of redress in cases of financial loss, mistake or
fraud because e-wallet providers, exchanges and trade platforms are not regulated and do 
not have a physical presence.” FIN. MARKETS LAW COMM., ISSUES OF LEGAL UNCERTAINTY 
ARISING IN THE CONTEXT OF VIRTUAL CURRENCIES 18 n.34 (2016), http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/ 
2/6/5/8/26584807/virtual_currencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/M43W-UJ4W].
22. Such growth can be observed in China, where the instances of fraud and
mismanagement in the field of online lending have signaled the need for regulatory 
intervention. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, The Complex Regulatory Landscape for FinTech: 
An Uncertain Future for Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Lending, GEO. UNIV. CTR.
FOR FIN. MARKETS & POLICY WHITE PAPER 24 (Aug. 2016), http://www3.weforum.org/ 
docs/WEF_The_Complex_Regulatory_Landscape_for_FinTech_290816.pdf [https://perma.
cc/TW2Q-CNYG]. A prominent example is the scandal involving the once largest peer­
to-peer lending platform Ezubao, which turned out to be a Ponzi scheme that had collected
almost 60 billion yuan (over USD 9 billion) from more than 900,000 investors. In
September 2017, a Beijing court sentenced 27 participants in the fraudulent scheme to 
various terms in jail, including two life sentences. See Leader of China’s $9 Billion Ezubao
Online Scam Gets Life; 26 Jailed, REUTERS (Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-china-fraud/leader-of-chinas-9-billion-ezubao-online-scam-gets-life-26-jailed-idUSK 
CN1BN0J6 [hereinafter Ezubao Online Scam] [https://perma.cc/JYF7-YF7T]. 
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control and oversight23 (e.g. various applications of DLT, including
smart contracts).24 
The opportunities offered by FinTech have been used by some commentators
as the basis for predicting a possible end to existing banking practices and
have prompted calls for a totally new approach to regulation:
Restoring a functioning financial system in the digital age requires a fundamental 
overhaul of financial regulation. If regulators do not progress to the digital age, 
our financial system will remain in its current dysfunctional state.25 
In many situations, FinTech-specific regulatory measures are limited to 
clarifying the existing law as it applies in the context of new technologies, 
such as by adding new definitions like “virtual currencies”,26 explaining
the legal status of the new concepts (e.g. whether Bitcoin27 is a commodity,
23.  Virtual currency schemes are a good example. The European Central Bank has 
stressed that “the global scope that most of . . . virtual communities enjoy not only hinders 
the identification of the jurisdiction under which the system’s rules and procedures should 
eventually be interpreted, it also means the location of the participants and the scheme
owner are hard to establish.” Consequently, the ECB has concluded that “governments 
and central banks would face serious difficulties if they tried to control or ban any virtual 
currency scheme, and it is not even clear to what extent they are permitted to obtain
information from them.” See EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, supra note 14, at 42–43. 
24. See also Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 1, at 6. On disintermediation effects 
of FinTech, see Chris Brummer, Disruptive Technology and Securities Regulation, 84 
FORDHAM L. REV. 977, 1020–35 (2015). 
 25. Jonathan McMillan, Banking in the Digital Age: the Failure of Financial
Regulation, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 20, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable­
business/2015/jan/20/finance-in-digital-age-while-regulation-stuck-in-industrial [https:// 
perma.cc/Y7ED-SB9H].
26. See Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council 
amending Directive (EU) 2015/849 on the Prevention of the Use of the Financial System 
for the Purposes of Money Laundering or Terrorist Financing and amending Directive
2009/101/EC, at art. 1(2)(c), COM (2016) 450 final (July 5, 2016) (defining virtual 
currencies as “a digital representation of value that is neither issued by a central bank or a
public authority, nor necessarily attached to a fiat currency, but is accepted by natural or legal
persons as a means of payment and can be transferred, stored or traded electronically”).
27. Bitcoin is a form of virtual currency which has no single administrator or
repository. In a recent US case the mechanics of Bitcoin transactions were described as
follows: “Bitcoins are held at, and sent to and from, bitcoin ‘addresses.’ A bitcoin ‘wallet’ 
is a software file that holds bitcoin addresses. Along with each bitcoin address, a bitcoin
wallet stores the ‘private key’ for the address, essentially a password used by the holder to 
access the bitcoins held at the address, as well as the transaction history associated with 
the address. Whoever has the private key for a bitcoin address controls the bitcoins held at 
that address.” See SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 130781, at 
*3 (E.D.Tex, Sept. 18, 2014). 
 321














   
 
 






    
    
 
 
   








a currency, a new type of money, or something entirely different)28 or
determining which regulators are authorized to address the new FinTech
solutions. 
In other cases, FinTech regulation ends up being more intrusive. In 
China, the machinations with one of the most popular lending platforms29 
prompted the tightening of the existing rules in 2016. Under the new rules, 
peer-to-peer platforms are unable to take deposits, offer wealth management 
services or issue asset-backed securities and are required to engage third 
party custodian banks.30 
In most cases, regulatory measures aimed at FinTech businesses do not 
take the form of a standalone “FinTech law” or “FinTech statute”.31 Instead, 
regulators generally try to adjust the existing legal framework to address 
the peculiarities of FinTech. This usually involves tackling FinTech on a
product by product basis (e.g. regulating crowdfunding platforms as a 
form of lending activity), which consequently reduces the pressure to come
up with a working definition of FinTech in the first place.
At the same time, there are instances where regulatory interventions 
target FinTech generally. An example is the concept of a FinTech “sandbox”, 
a safe supervised environment created by regulators that allows innovative 
businesses to test the new products and solutions prior to their full
implementation.32 These sandboxes target a variety of entities and are 
generally not limited to a particular financial product. As a result, underlying
 28. See In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15–29, 2015 WL 5535736 (Sept. 17, 2015) 
(explaining the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) ruled “Bitcoin and 
other virtual currencies are . . . properly defined as commodities” for the purposes of the
Commodity Exchange Act), SEC v. Shavers, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 194382, at 2 (for an 
example of a regulator classifying Bitcoin investments as “securities”), and I.R.S. Notice 
2014–21, 2014–16 I.R.B. 938 (explaining the I.R.S. classified Bitcoin as a “property”). 
29. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, Complex Regulatory Landscape, supra note 22; Ezubao 
Online Scam, supra note 22. 
30. China Takes Forceful Steps to Tame Unruly Peer-to-Peer Lending Sector, 
REUTERS (Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-banks-cbrc/china­
takes-forceful-steps-to-tame-unruly-peer-to-peer-lending-sector-idUSKCN10Z17F?il=0
[https://perma.cc/A6K7-HG4Y].
31.  It should be noted, however, that on March 23, 2017, a dedicated FinTech bill (the 
draft Financial Technology Law) was published in Mexico and made open for consultation. See 




32.  The Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”) in the UK defines a regulatory sandbox 
as “a ‘safe space’ in which businesses can test innovative products, services, business 
models and delivery mechanisms without immediately incurring all the normal regulatory
consequences of engaging in the activity in question.” See Regulatory Sandbox, FIN.
CONDUCT AUTH. (Nov. 2015), https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/research/regulatory­
sandbox.pdf [https://perma.cc/HP8Y-UMJ5]. 
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sandbox rules tend to be broad enough to encompass most FinTech
businesses. Regulators, however, when designing their sandbox rules,
often avoid defining FinTech. The Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”)
in the UK, for example, avoids the term altogether, speaking of a
“regulatory sandbox” instead.33 The Monetary Authority of Singapore
(“MAS”), on the contrary, uses the term “FinTech,” but defines it simply 
as “financial technology” without any further explanation.34 The latter 
approach is also utilized by the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission (“ASIC”).35 
C. Feasibility of Dedicated FinTech Regulation 
In designing their response to FinTech, regulators need to be careful to 
avoid duplication of legal regimes, since FinTech businesses, like other
businesses, continue to be governed by the rules applicable to all companies 
generally, as well as by the rules targeting financial services and their
providers. This fact prompts an important question of identifying criteria 
that can be used to differentiate FinTech from any other business or activity: 
after all, FinTech regulation, by its nature, is merely an “add-on” to financial 
services regulation designed to address the specific characteristics of
FinTech that require regulatory interference. 
A seemingly straightforward solution would be to adopt a two-stage 
process: (1) devising a clear definition of FinTech, or criteria necessary
and sufficient to separate this concept from any other; and (2) identifying 
those areas within FinTech which require regulatory intervention. However,
the lack of a commonly accepted definition of FinTech in existing literature,
 33. See Regulatory Sandbox, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Feb. 14 2, 2018), https://www. 
fca.org.uk/firms/regulatory-sandbox [https://perma.cc/2BDN-4MGT].
34. See FinTech Regulatory Sandbox Guidelines, MONETARY AUTH. OF SING. 3 
(Nov. 16, 2016), http://www.mas.gov.sg/~/media/Smart%20Financial%20Centre/Sandbox/
FinTech%20Regulatory%20Sandbox%20Guidelines.pdf [https://perma.cc/VHU4-JH3F]. 
35. See Testing Fintech Products and Services Without Holding an AFS or Credit 
Licence, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N 1 (Aug. 23, 2017), http://download.asic.gov.au/media/
4420907/rg257-published-23-august-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVE4-87VY]. More recently, 
another Australian regulator—the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (“APRA”)
—did provide an actual definition of FinTech in a public consultation document, but the 
term was used merely for illustrative purposes and was not linked to any regulatory
consequences, thus eliminating the risk of providing an over- or under-inclusive definition.
See Licensing: A Phased Approach to Authorising New Entrants to the Banking Industry, 
AUSTL. PRUDENTIAL REG. AUTH. 6, 11, 19 (Aug. 15, 2017), http://www.apra.gov.au/About 
APRA/Documents/Phased-licence-discussion-paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/8QHA-EFTT].
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which was discussed in section IV.A, shows that regulators might face
difficulties even at the first stage of this process. To consider possible
practical solutions, this Article will now consider two recent international 
consultations aimed to improve the FinTech regulatory framework, which 
have adopted different approaches to the problem of characterizing FinTech. 
In June 2017, the Financial Stability Board (“FSB”) published a report 
defining FinTech as “technology-enabled innovation in financial services 
that could result in new business models, applications, processes or products
with an associated material effect on the provision of financial services.”36 
This definition goes beyond the generic reference to a certain mixture of 
finance and technology. Particularly, this definition adds further criteria 
to measure the novelty of innovation and its effects and seems to suggest 
that minimal changes to existing technology are not captured by the definition.
With this approach however, the criteria used to differentiate FinTech from 
the other, less innovative, changes or applications of technology, are qualitative 
by nature and, as a result, retain an element of uncertainty. It is not entirely 
clear when the effect on financial services is deemed “material” enough
to qualify as FinTech. 
The European Commission (“EC”) approached the matter differently in 
its 2017 consultation paper.37 On the one hand, it defined FinTech very 
broadly, as “technology-enabled innovation in financial services, regardless
of the nature or size of the provider of the services.”38 On the other hand,
the EC paper differentiated between “non-disruptive FinTech,” which “triggers 
incremental innovation and increases efficiency,” and the so-called “disruptive 
FinTech” resulting in “more radical breakthroughs.”39 This classification 
is largely grounded in the reality that technological innovation in the financial 
services sector is not uniform and can have very different effects, ranging 
in their magnitude and their potential impact on the market as a whole.40 
However, the main difference between this approach and the one adopted
by the FSB is that FinTech is treated as a much broader concept, covering 
even the minimal innovation (the latter might not be treated as FinTech at 
all using the FSB terminology).
 36. Financial Stability Implications from FinTech: Supervisory and Regulatory Issues
that Merit Authorities’ Attention, FIN.STABILITY BD. 7 (June 27, 2017), http://www.fsb.org/wp­
content/uploads/R270617.pdf [https://perma.cc/7KPY-DRR3] (emphasis added). 
37. FinTech: A More Competitive and Innovative European Financial Sector, 
EUROPEAN COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/2017-fintech-consultation­
document_en_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/34W4-4JS3].
38. Id. at 4. 
39. Id.
40. For a similar, broad approach to defining FinTech, see Koffi, supra note 13, at 
772–73. 
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Both approaches are conceptually sound, as they are based on the
understanding that financial innovation is a multifaceted notion. For the 
purposes of this Article, however, the fact that neither method has managed
to provide a clear set of criteria differentiating the truly innovative solutions 
from the rest is of great importance. The lack of certainty can be particularly
problematic in “borderline” situations, e.g. when an incumbent financial 
institution utilizes breakthrough artificial intelligence technologies to
automate a routine procedure, such as fraud evaluation in payment transactions, 
which does not result in the creation of a new product or service, but merely
enhances the existing processes.
The difficulties with measuring the transformative effects of innovation
may suggest that development of “FinTech-specific” rules is unrealistic and 
that the better approach is to maintain the “standard” regulatory structure
of financial services regulation built around different products and activities. 
However, despite the apparent difficulties, there are advantages in devising 
rules specifically targeting the effects of financial innovation (whether or
not classified as FinTech). First, existing regulatory structures are often 
inflexible and may require adjustment every time a new disruptive technology
is implemented. Second, some FinTech-based solutions may end up triggering 
multiple layers of regulation at once. For example, the so-called “initial
coin offerings” (“ICOs”)41 can be simultaneously affected by rules governing 
cryptocurrencies and crowdfunding.
A possible solution in these circumstances is to address the diverse 
transformative effects of FinTech and implement a more flexible, principles- 
based approach.42 This approach may allow regulators to overcome the
uncertainty surrounding the legal nature and characteristics of FinTech
and instead begin focusing on the more important question: what exactly
needs regulation? This question becomes particularly relevant in the context 
of new decentralized technologies (such as decentralized virtual currencies
41. An ICO is a method of raising finance for a new virtual (usually cryptographic) 
currency venture, whereby investors receive the newly issued virtual currency (known as 
“tokens”) in exchange for their investment (which can be in the form of money or even
another virtual currency). See Dirk A. Zetzsche et. al., The ICO Gold Rush: It’s a Scam, 
It’s a Bubble, It’s a Super Challenge for Regulators (Univ. of Lux. Faculty of Law Econ. 
& Fin. Working Paper, No. 2017-011), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3072298 [https://perma.cc/W765-R29S].
42. See Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 1, at 6–7. For a discussion about principles-
based regulation more generally, see, e.g., Julia Black, The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles
Based Regulation (LSE L., Soc’y & Econ. Working Paper No. 17/2010), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1712862 [https://perma.cc/MD9P-3S2W]. 
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based on peer-to-peer networks)43 that are particularly difficult to control.
As in the case of the Internet, the solution might ultimately lie not in the 
regulation of technology as such, but rather in its application in a specific 
context.44 
The added benefit of this approach is its resilience in the face of further 
development and increasing complexity of terminology surrounding
FinTech. A recent example of such development is the introduction of a 
new and potentially confusing term, “TechFin” to refer to a business model
where non-financial businesses build relationships with existing clients,
obtain massive amounts of data from them, and seek to commercialize those
data via the financial services market (e.g. by selling it to financial service 
providers, offering financial services to customers directly or otherwise).45 
While interesting from the academic perspective, such a classification
should not obscure the design of the regulatory response. 
V. REGULATING FINTECH: UNDERLYING CHALLENGES
Having acknowledged and explained the difficulties in identifying the
characteristic features of FinTech and the resulting regulatory implications, 
this Article will now take a broader look at the various challenges underlying 
FinTech regulation. For the purposes of the subsequent sections of this
Article, FinTech will be understood in a broad sense, as technology-enabled
43. For example, Bitcoin, according to the ECB, “does not have a central authority
in charge of money supply, nor a central clearing house, nor are financial institutions
involved in the transactions, since users perform all these tasks themselves.” See EUROPEAN 
CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, supra note 14, at 6. For general information
on Bitcoin, see also Shavers, supra note 27, at *2. 
44. In the case of the Internet, the major problem also lies in the nature of 
underlying technology that is difficult to control. In a seminal case Reno v. ACLU, 521 
U.S. 844, 851 (1997), the U.S. Supreme Court described the Internet as “a unique medium—
known to its users as ‘cyberspace’—located in no particular geographical location but 
available to anyone, anywhere in the world, with access to the Internet.” For an outline of
resulting challenges, particularly in the area of state jurisdiction and control, see, e.g., 
Christopher Kuner, The Internet and the Global Reach of EU Law, (LSE L., Soc’y & Econ. 
Working Paper No. 4/2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2890930 
[https://perma.cc/SK2B-7J5R]; DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON, SOLVING THE INTERNET
JURISDICTION PUZZLE 1 (2017). For a recent example of the implications of a government’s 
attempt to exercise jurisdiction over the Internet, see, e.g., Russia Blocks Google, Amazon
IP Addresses in Bid to Ban Telegram, REUTERS (Apr. 17, 2018, 6:13 AM), https://www. 
reuters.com/article/us-russia-telegram-ipaddresses/russia-blocks-google-amazon-ip­
addresses-in-bid-to-ban-telegram-idUSKBN1HO1WM [https://perma.cc/JKT4-MXZE]. 
45. See Dirk A. Zetzsche et. al., From FinTech to TechFin: The Regulatory
Challenges of Data-Driven Finance, 9–11 (European Banking Inst. Working Paper 2017 
No 6). It should be noted that the authors of the above paper acknowledge the difficulties 
with defining “TechFin” as a separate category and “prefer the term ‘TechFin’ to be understood
more as one describing a perspective rather than serving as a formal definitional concept.”
See id. at 6 n.16. 
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innovation in financial services, regardless of the degree of novelty resulting 
from it or the consequences for the market and other stakeholders; this is done
in order to cover the broader spectrum of regulatory challenges.
A. FinTech Regulation: Four Key Questions 
The four key questions below can help shape the regulatory approach
to FinTech. A clear understanding and an informed response by regulators 
to all key questions will simplify and streamline the rulemaking process,
putting it in perspective and creating a systematic approach. 
1. What is the Overall Objective of FinTech Regulation?
FinTech regulation can be structured in a number of ways, depending
on the objectives pursued by the regulator. 
On the one hand, the regulatory regime can fulfill a prudential role, 
focusing on systemic risks and threats to the wider economy and protecting 
consumers. On the other hand, regulation can actively promote FinTech, 
either by eliminating artificial barriers for entry, or by establishing a preferential
regime for FinTech businesses.46 In the latter case, regulators act as facilitators 
and develop various techniques, like regulatory sandboxes mentioned earlier, 
to foster the development of the FinTech sector.47 FinTech promotion, in
turn, can be driven by two different objectives: (1) the need to increase market
competition,48 or (2) the desire to achieve greater levels of financial inclusion.49 
46.  Brummer and Gorfine similarly distinguish between the “engagement” and the 
“enforcement” approaches to regulation. See Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 1, at 10–11. 
47. For a more detailed discussion of various FinTech-promoting regulatory techniques, 
see Dirk A. Zetzsche et. al., Regulating a Revolution: From Regulatory Sandboxes to
Smart Regulation, 23 FORDHAM J. CORP. FIN. L. 31 (2017). The authors differentiate four
alternative approaches to FinTech regulation: (i) doing nothing, (ii) cautious experimentation on a
case-by-case basis (e.g. no-action letters), (iii) structured experimentation (e.g. regulatory
sandboxes) and (iv) so-called “smart regulation” involving four stages (testing, a regulatory
sandbox, a restricted license and a full license). Id. at 91, 98 (providing a more detailed 
discussion of various FinTech-promoting regulatory techniques). 
48. See Promoting Competition, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH. (Dec. 11, 2017), https://www. 
fca.org.uk/about/promoting-competition [https://perma.cc/9KBU-J2F7]. 
49. When announcing the plans to introduce special purpose national charters to 
fintech companies in the US in late 2016, the Comptroller of the Currency Thomas Curry
noted that “[f]intech companies hold great potential to expand financial inclusion, empower
consumers, and help families and businesses take more control of their financial matters.”
See Thomas J. Curry, Comptroller of the Currency, Address at Georgetown University 
Law Center: Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech Companies, GEO. U. L.
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The two objectives listed above may come into direct conflict, in which 
case a policy decision must be made as to which is the main objective of 
the FinTech regulation. This choice is driven by a variety of factors, including 
macroeconomic goals, such as the level of financial inclusion: it is conceivable 
that in economies with large numbers of unbanked population, the opportunity
to provide access to financial services to the masses would outweigh the 
underlying risks of fraud and client abuse. 
Whenever FinTech promotion is considered as the underlying regulatory
objective, regulators need to carefully consider whether FinTech businesses
might require some form of preferential treatment to make new products 
and solutions more attractive, at least to a certain extent. This is important
since FinTech solutions can be developed by both incumbent financial 
institutions and start-ups. For smaller companies, it is not uncommon to
be subject to lower regulatory requirements. The rationale for this varies 
from the intention to avoid overburdening companies without the resources 
to maintain a dedicated compliance team to the limited need for consumer 
protection due to their smaller customer base (and the corresponding lower 
overall impact on the market). 
It is thus conceivable that FinTech businesses may be offered preferential 
treatment for a variety of reasons. For example, in certain regions, the
local demand for financial services may be insufficient to keep the new
technologies profitable. It would thus fall to regulators to both identify the 
areas or technologies where the new developments are desirable and to 
devise measures to promote them. Similarly, special rules for FinTech 
businesses may be established when the existing financial services regulation 
offers no flexibility and requires start-ups to obtain a full banking license 
to offer a new product.
Eligibility requirements for regulatory sandboxes50 require careful balancing
of policy considerations. If the key selection criteria are primarily based 
on the quality of the proposed business model or technological solution, 
then the resulting regulation ends up favoring either incumbent financial 
institutions that develop new FinTech products internally or start-ups that 
operate in collaboration with such financial institutions or incubators.51 
Smaller companies operating independently lack the sophistication required
to compete effectively and would end up being side-lined. This raises the
question of regulatory priorities. If in the alternative, the key objective is 
to increase the level of competition, then sandboxes can be utilized as an
CTR. 3–4 (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/speeches/2016/pub­
speech-2016-152.pdf [https://perma.cc/HZQ3-MWR4]. 
50. See FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., supra note 32. 
51. These start-ups possess greater resources, including new product approval processes, 
as well as legal and regulatory compliance checks.
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instrument for levelling the playing field for under-resourced FinTech 
businesses (when structured accordingly).52 
Overall, the regulator’s first step in designing the FinTech regulatory
model should be clearly setting its own priorities. What exactly does the 
regulator intend to achieve? Whose interests should be balanced? How 
should these interests be weighed against each other? These priorities need to
be realistic—a broad declaration of support towards FinTech or a list of 
mutually exclusive objectives can send mixed signals to the market. Without a
clear overarching objective, the regulation is likely to be inconsistent.
There is a risk that, instead of aiming to reach certain goals, the new rules
will simply attempt to “retrofit” the new technological developments into 
the existing regulation.
2. Regulate Now or “Wait and See”? 
In a number of jurisdictions, some regulators have chosen a cautious
“wait and see” approach to FinTech regulation; others have attempted to 
be more forward-looking.53 While both strategies may yield benefits, it is
important from the regulatory perspective to weigh the expected benefits 
against the potential risks and costs resulting from the adoption of the 
new technological solutions. This balance poses a difficult challenge. How
does one perform the cost benefit analysis ex ante when empirical data are
either limited or unavailable? What is the most appropriate methodology? 
A robust, independent and verifiable ex ante social and economic impact 
assessment (“SEIA”) can help a regulator decide whether to adopt new 
rules and can be particularly useful when comparing alternative regulatory 
solutions. 
The outcome of a SEIA can also help to determine when regulators should
intervene, and in what way. Premature regulation can stifle innovation, 
whereas delayed regulation can lead to missed growth opportunities, as well 
as failure to spot major (including systemic) risks. The traditional timelines
of regulators may also be eclipsed by the speed of developments in the
FinTech sector. The words of the FCA Chairman John Griffith-Jones are 
illustrative: 
52. See generally Zetzsche et. al., supra note 47, at 69–77. 
53. See id. at 47–58. 
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We have come to realise that the more detailed regulation that we have, the
greater the challenge of keeping it all current [. . .] Rules that were designed for
the paperwork era do not work necessarily for the online one.54 
Deciding the most appropriate time to regulate FinTech activities is 
greatly influenced by the speed at which certain technologies advance. 
One of the most recent developments is the launch of a new type of 
cryptographic virtual currency, Bitcoin Cash,55 which was launched on
August 1, 2017.56 This was done due to competing plans to modernize
Bitcoin57 either by increasing the block size, or by moving certain information 
into a separate file transmitted alongside the block.58 The change resulted 
in massive swings in Bitcoin prices and essentially gave birth to a new
virtual currency overnight (with the mining59 of block 478559). The implications 
involve a potential change in the mining landscape. Early reports suggest
a great deal of consolidation whereby Bitcoin Cash was dominated by a
very small number of players60 (as opposed to the “standard” Bitcoin, where
mining is largely decentralized).61 
Additionally, another reason for sooner regulatory intervention may lie 
in the dispersed nature of FinTech businesses, which often take the form
of small start-up companies with limited resources and legal expertise. In
contrast to incumbent financial institutions, these market players are not
 54. John Griffith Jones, FCA Chairman, Address at Cambridge Judge Business
School (Feb. 13, 2017) https://www.fca.org.uk/news/speeches/what-makes-good-conduct­
regulation [https://perma.cc/TD8L-98R5]. 
55. See BITCOINCASH, https://www.bitcoincash.org [https://perma.cc/48TN-DU26]
(last visited Apr. 9, 2018). 
56. Laura Shin, A Second Version Of Bitcoin Has Launched. Could It Threaten The 
Original?, FORBES (Aug. 2, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/laurashin/2017/08/02/a­
second-version-of-bitcoin-has-launched-could-it-threaten-the-original/#5a292ac844a7 
[https://perma.cc/ZFC8-YRQN]. 
57. See supra note 27, and accompanying text. 
58. A “block” is an electronic permanent record of each transaction with Bitcoin.
See Block, BITCOINWIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Block (last modified Mar. 16, 2018, 3:58 
PM) [http://perma.cc/Z27M-D6LT]. 
59. “Mining” is a process of adding new blocks to Bitcoin’s public list (ledger) of
transactions. See Mining, BITCOINWIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Mining (last modified Feb. 22,
2018, 2:20 PM) [http://perma.cc/VKU4-AGN8]; see also Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A 
Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (original paper written by
Nakamoto and made accessible through Bitcoin.org) [https://perma.cc/ZYJ8-FAX7].
60. See Bitcoin Cash is Not Decentralised! . . . 92% of the Blocks are Mined by only 
2 Miners, STEEMIT, https://steemit.com/bitcoin/@penguinpablo/bitcoin-cash-is-not­
decentralised-92-of-the-blocks-are-mined-by-only-2-miners [http://perma.cc/RV59-C29R] 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
61. See Hashrate Distribution: An estimation of hashrate distribution amongst the 
largest mining pools, BLOCKCHAIN, https://blockchain.info/pools  [http://perma.cc/32UM-6EZ5] 
(last visited Apr. 9, 2018).
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accustomed to being engaged in an ongoing dialogue with regulators and,
unless first approached by the latter, often prefer to stay “under the radar.”
Waiting too long can entail reputational risks: customers may lose trust
in FinTech solutions if there are major global or regional failures in the 
future. A lack of regulation may also encourage regulatory arbitrage,62 as
heavily regulated entities might use FinTech to expand into less regulated
spaces to circumvent regulations. 
At the same time, it is important not to overstate every disruptive
development of technology, as the future of financial services markets might 
lie in the gradual evolution and improvement of the existing banking models,
rather than in the radical change of the financing landscape. Even if this
is true, it might be desirable, at least, to ensure that FinTech 
developments can become competitive enough to drive the change within 
the financial institutions and encourage improvement. 
3. Which FinTech Areas Require Priority in Terms of  
Regulatory Attention?
Two key factors generally determine where the regulators should direct 
their immediate attention: systemic risks and pressing social and economic 
issues. Depending on the jurisdiction in question, certain FinTech activities
may be associated with higher systemic risks, warranting greater regulatory
scrutiny. In China, the fall of the online peer-to-peer platform Ezubao in
late 2015 persuaded the government to restrict online lending practices.63 
Some technologies may offer solutions to the more pressing problems
specific to the jurisdiction in question, such as by increasing the level of
financial inclusion in countries with large numbers of unbanked population
(as was the case with M-Pesa in Kenya).64 In these circumstances, regulation 
can be crucial to allowing or disallowing the application of the new 
technology and tapping its benefits. 
Different applications of the same technology may occupy different 
spots on the regulators’ priority lists due to dissimilar regulatory concerns. 
62. Regulatory arbitrage is a practice of taking advantage of loopholes in existing
regulatory framework for one’s own benefit. 
63. See supra notes 22, 30, and accompanying text. 
64. See, e.g., Jay K. Rosengard, A Quantum Leap Over High Hurdles to Financial

















     
 
 
    
     
   
   
 
   





A good example is the distributed ledger technology,65 which can be
utilized in a variety of end use applications. Some of them, such as cryptographic 
virtual currencies, can exist and develop even without dedicated regulation, 
as has been demonstrated by Bitcoin. For other applications, such as smart
contracts,66 however, a clear and consistent regulation may be necessary 
to give peace of mind to market participants interested in adopting the new 
technology.
4. Are the Key Challenges Internal (Domestic) or External 
(International)? 
The mandates of national regulators are limited and prioritize the stability
of the domestic financial system. However, FinTech by its nature is capable 
of transcending borders. On the one hand, this capability raises the issue 
of how operations of foreign FinTech companies should be regulated to
the extent that they affect the local financial system. On the other hand,
for some FinTech businesses, such as those operating in the payments
sector, the ability to expand to other jurisdictions may be crucial, particularly 
when local demand is insufficient. In these cases, international (e.g. regional) 
interoperability becomes a condition for the continued application of the 
FinTech solution.67 Thus, there is the issue of how much foreign regulators
can affect a domestic regulatory regime. 
There is an opportunity for international cross-pollination of best practices 
to meet the overall objectives underpinning the regulatory system. However, 
if one of those objectives is to attract more FinTech companies into a certain
jurisdiction, there is a danger of a “race-to-the-bottom” for the most deregulated 
environment. The spread of regulatory sandboxes may be seen in this light. 
65. See supra note 19, and accompanying text. 
66. In a recent DLT report by the UK Government Chief Scientific Adviser, “smart 
contracts” are defined as “contracts whose terms are recorded in a computer language
instead of legal language.” See  GOVERNMENTAL OFFICE FOR SCI., DISTRIBUTED LEDGER
TECHNOLOGY: BEYOND BLOCK CHAIN 18, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/492972/gs-16-1-distributed-ledger-technology.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/JM6B-QZEF].
67. A 2017 Chatham House report stresses (in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa)
that “because of the small size of most internal markets, economies of scale can often only
be achieved through regional integration.” See Henry Thompson, et. al., Developing Businesses
of Scale in Sub-Saharan Africa: Insights from Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia, 
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B. Challenges to FinTech Regulation
Answers to the four questions raised in section V.A can create a firm basis
for the development of a FinTech regulatory framework. However, the 
underlying process is fraught with difficulties, which will be summarized
in this section. 
1. FinTech Regulation and the Rule of Law 
Analysis shows that many of the challenges underlying the regulation
of FinTech are not technology-related. In fact, some of the most pronounced
issues are common for all areas of the law. There is a need for legal clarity
and certainty and a need to ensure equal treatment of various parties and 
exercise regulatory powers within the limits set by the law. Each of these 
have one thing in common: they form the basis of a rule of law compliant 
legal regime—one that follows the principle that “all persons and authorities 
within the state, whether public or private, should be bound by and entitled 
to the benefit of laws.”68 For this reason, the various challenges connected 
with this principle have been grouped in a separate category (“rule of law 
challenges”) in the following section. Other more specific challenges, like
the various mechanics involved in the proper functioning of the financial 
services markets, are discussed in a later section. 
2. Rule of Law Challenges 
a. The Need for Legal Clarity, Certainty and Predictability69 
1. Regulatory Fragmentation and Regulatory Arbitrage 
FinTech cuts across a number of sectors, and thus it is often difficult to 
assign it to a single FinTech regulator. Multiplicity of regulators, coupled 
with overlapping responsibilities and authority, may lead to inefficiencies 
and inconsistencies.70 
Even in jurisdictions where the regulation of financial services has been 
consolidated in the hands of a single regulator (e.g. the Central Bank of 
68. TOM BINGHAM, THE RULE OF LAW 8 (2010).
69. According to Tom Bingham, “[t]he law must be accessible and so far as possible 
intelligible, clear and predictable.” See id. at 37. 
70. See Knight, supra note 9, at 23–25. It should be noted that multiplicity of
regulators may also have its advantages, such as the potential for increased transparency
or regulatory competition. See id. at 22–23. 
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the Russian Federation (“CBR”), known as the “mega-regulator”),71 
communication and data protection matters are likely to have dedicated 
regulators that oversee the use of technology. For example, mobile money72 
systems may be simultaneously regulated by both banking and
telecommunications regulators. Coexistence of parallel regulation systems
creates an opportunity for businesses to seek regulatory arbitrage. 
In countries with multiple (e.g. local and federal) regulatory levels the
problem is more pronounced, as conflicts of authority may emerge. One 
of the best examples of such conflicts is United States. In December 2016,
the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”) published an initiative
envisaging the issuance of special purpose national bank charters to FinTech 
companies.73 This initiative was met with strong opposition from the state 
regulators and culminated in a lawsuit brought by the Conference of State 
Bank Supervisors against the OCC and the Comptroller of the Currency 
in April 2017.74 The plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief 
arguing the OCC’s creation of the nonbank charter was unlawful and
pleaded to the court to enjoin the OCC from pursuing it, stating that the 
OCC “acted beyond its statutory authority”75 and “because the OCC has 
not offered a reasoned explanation for its decision, its actions should be deemed
not only contrary to law, but also arbitrary, capricious, and an abuse of
discretion.”76 
2. Uncertainty About Where New Products Fall in the
Existing Regulatory System 
The financial services sector is heavily regulated in most jurisdictions. 
As a result, new FinTech solutions often end up being already covered by
71. In 2013, the CBR took over the duties of the Federal Financial Services Markets
Authority and thus consolidated the functions of the banking, securities and insurance regulator.
THE CENT. BANK OF THE RUSS. FED’N, ANN. 2013 REP. 13 (2013). 
72. Mobile money is a technology enabling access to financial services directly
through a mobile phone that does not require the client to open a separate bank account (as 
opposed to mobile banking, which simply allows customers to access their bank accounts 
via a mobile device). See  CLAIRE SCHARWATT ET. AL., 2014 STATE OF THE INDUSTRY:
MOBILE FINANCIAL SERVICES FOR THE UNBANKED 10–11 (2014), https://www.gsma.com/ 
mobilefordevelopment/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/SOTIR_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/
7BVN-X7AV].
73. See generally Exploring Special Purpose National Bank Charters for Fintech
Companies, OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY (Dec. 2016), https://www.occ.gov/
topics/responsible-innovation/comments/special-purpose-national-bank-charters-for-fintech.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MJ59-U4FZ].
74. Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of Comptroller of Currency & 
Curry, No. 1:17-cv-00763 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2017). 
75. See id. at 3, para 7.
76. See id. at 4, para 10.
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existing law. However, in many situations, the legal status of the new product 
or service cannot be clearly determined, either because there is a “gap” in 
regulation, or because different regulations conflict with each other.77 
The lack of certainty may be particularly detrimental to FinTech start­
ups and small and medium enterprises (“SMEs”). While it is common for 
financial institutions to develop closer relationships with the regulator to 
clarify the existing legal position, smaller FinTech businesses may not be
prepared for this dialogue and will often lack the resources to seek third 
party legal advice. 
Further regulatory intervention may still be necessary even where pre­
existing regulatory constructs are generally sufficient to support the new 
technology. In these cases, it is equally important to avoid the duplication
of legal regimes and clarify the regulator’s position with respect to the 
new technologies.78 
The lack of legal certainty can come at major opportunity costs for the 
economy. For example, in Africa, where most crowdfunding79 follows the 
donation (i.e. non-return) model, insufficient clarity of existing regulation 
(e.g. in respect of the legal status of online lending platforms) may explain, at
least partly, the slow pace of development of a debt-based crowdfunding 
model.80 A recent open discussion on the regulatory challenges for FinTech
in Africa concluded that clarity is “the most important requirement” for the 
growth of crowdfunding in the region.81 
77. In its 2012 report the ECB concluded that “[v]irtual currency schemes visibly
lack a proper legal framework, as well as a clear definition of rights and obligations for 
the different “parties” and that the “[k]ey payment system concepts such as the finality of
the settlement do not seem to be clearly “specified.” See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL 
CURRENCY SCHEMES, supra note 14, at 42. 
78. For examples of various measures adopted by the regulators in Australia, Canada,
the EU, the UK and the US in addressing the robo-advisory activities, see IOSCO Research 
Report on Financial Technologies, IOSCO 35 n.90 (Feb. 2017), https://www.iosco.org/ 
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD554.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7KA-P5K3].
79. On different types of crowdfunding, see John Armour & Luca Enriques, The
Promise and Perils of Crowdfunding: Between Corporate Finance and Consumer Contracts, 
(ECGI Working Paper No. 366/2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract 
_id=3035247 [https://perma.cc/GAV4-577E].











    
  
      
 
 












   
   
 
   




3. Lack of Clear and Accessible Regulatory Guidance/Lack of 
Communication from the Regulator
Smaller FinTech businesses often lack the capacity to engage with existing 
law—especially when the law is not easily accessible without specialized
training. When rules are not easily understood, even if the regulator is open
for a dialogue, a small FinTech business might still require a facilitator, 
or a FinTech “incubator,”82 to “translate” between FinTech firms and
regulators to ensure that the two sides of the dialogue understand each other.
The lack of a common language further increases the divide that already
exists based on different approaches taken by both sides (risk averse regulators, 
on the one hand, and risk-taking FinTech businesses, on the other). 
FinTech incubators and incumbent financial institutions that work with 
FinTech businesses are in a good position to facilitate dialogue with the
regulator in this regard. In the process of selecting FinTech partners/ 
investment targets, they accumulate important empirical data and analyze 
the law for any gaps or inconsistencies in the context of the new
technological solution.
In addition, overreliance on principles-based guidance83 may lead to a 
lack of certainty and may discourage businesses, particularly if coupled 
with the lack of regulatory support in navigating the regulations, the lack
of communication on authorization processes and the absence of a single
point of contact with the regulator.
4. Lack of International Coordination
There is insufficient coordination among regulators around the globe in 
addressing FinTech-specific matters. As a result, various jurisdictions have 
adopted different approaches in regulating the same FinTech solutions. 
The lack of uniformity becomes particularly relevant in the context of
decentralized and delocalized technologies (such as DLT),84 making it
hard to draw a line in the application of different regulatory regimes. 
A good example of illustrating these different approaches are cryptocurrencies. 
Although most countries have chosen a “hands off” approach, some countries
have already taken action, either by classifying virtual currencies in accordance 
82. “Incubators” (or “accelerators”) are business development programs offering 
FinTech (usually start-up) firms various kinds of support (technological due diligence, mentorship, 
office space, legal help, financial assistance etc.). See Boston Startup Accelerators, Incubators, 
& Support Program, BOSTON STARTUPS GUIDE, https://bostonstartupsguide.com/guide/
every-boston-startup-accelerator-incubator/  [https://perma.cc/ 556M-32RJ] (last visited
Mar. 26, 2018). 
83. See Brummer & Gorfine, supra note 1.
 84. See ESMA, supra note 19. 
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with domestic law (Australia85, the UK86), or by differentiating between
“real” and “fake” cryptocurrencies (Switzerland87). Russia contemplates
detailed rules governing cryptocurrencies88 with draft federal legislation 
already underway.89 Several states are also currently considering a more
radical response in the form of generally accessible digital central bank
money.90 The list of different approaches goes on and on.91
 85. GST – removing the double taxation of digital currency, AUSTL. TAX’N OFF.,
https://www.ato.gov.au/General/New-legislation/In-detail/Indirect-taxes/GST/GST—
removing-the-double-taxation-of-digital-currency/ [https://perma.cc/PJ59-7T84] (last visited 
Apr. 9, 2018).
86. Revenue and Customs Brief 9 (2014): Bitcoin and Other cryptocurrencies, HM
REVENUE & CUSTOMS (Mar. 3, 2014), https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ 
revenue-and-customs-brief-9-2014-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies/revenue-and­
customs-brief-9-2014-bitcoin-and-other-cryptocurrencies [https://perma.cc/L888-U7P4].
87. FINMA closes down coin providers and issues warning about fake cryptocurrencies,
FINMA (Sept. 19, 2017), https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2017/09/20170919-mm-coin-anbieter/ 
[https://perma.cc/XST5-ZS3Q].
88. Pavel Kantyshev, ЦБ и Минфин прояснили будущее криптовалют в России
[CB and the Ministry of Finance Have Clarified the Future for Cryptocurrencies in
Russia], VEDOMOSTI (Sept. 8, 2017), https://www.vedomosti.ru/finance/articles/2017/09/ 
08/733043-kriptovalyutah [https://perma.cc/MMC8-XCZS]. On 21 October 2017, the Russian
President issued a number of assignments aimed at developing the Russian FinTech regulatory
regime. These include: (i) defining the legal status of various technologies, such as DLT, 
(ii) developing rules governing the “mining” process (see Mining, supra note 59),
(iii) regulation of public coin offerings “by analogy to the initial offering of securities,” 
(iv) establishing a regulatory “sandbox” by the CBR and (v) creating a common payments area
in the Eurasian Economic Union. SeeПеречень поручений по итогам совещания по вопросу
использования цифровых технологий в финансовой сфере [The List of Assignments 
Resulting from the Meeting on the Use of Digital Technologies in the Financial Sphere], 
KREMLIN (Oct. 21, 2017), http://kremlin.ru/acts/assignments/orders/copy/55899 [https://perma.
cc/Y8M3-YD8Y].
89. See Draft Federal Law ‘On Digital Financial Assets” (as of 22 May 2018), 
http://sozd.parliament.gov.ru/bill/419059-7. The draft law defines not only “cryptocurrency,” but
also different technical terms, such as “mining,” “token” etc.
90. See, e.g., Sveriges Riksbank, The E-krona Project’s First Interim Report, 
https://www.riksbank.se/en-gb/financial-stability/the-financial-system/payments/does­
sweden-need-an-e-krona/the-e-krona-projects-first-interim-report/ (last updated Jan. 2, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/Q3V5-AKHV]. In contrast, under most existing payment systems central 
bank money (excluding cash) is directly available only to select users (banks, certain non-
bank financial institutions, governments, international organizations). For a more detailed
discussion relating to state-issued cryptocurrencies, see Morten Bech & Rodney Garratt, 
Central Bank Cryptocurrencies: BIS Quarterly Review, BIS (2017), https://www.bis.org/ 
publ/qtrpdf/r_qt1709f.pdf [https://perma.cc/AER3-DZTY].
91. For other regulatory responses see for example International Monetary Fund, 
Virtual Currencies and Beyond: Initial Considerations: IMF Staff Discussion Note, IMF
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5. Rapid Development of Technology
FinTech changes can be instantaneous, as demonstrated by the launch
of Bitcoin Cash on August 1, 2017.92At the same time, the application of
certain technologies may change over time, in some cases dramatically
altering the regulatory response. For example, some virtual currencies, like 
Bitcoin, were initially developed as decentralized instruments co-existing 
in parallel with their state-issued counterparts. However, now governments
are already considering establishing their own, state-controlled virtual
currencies.93 This change can significantly alter the regulatory agendas,
transitioning from a “hands-off” approach to a more nuanced regulation
differentiating between state and non-state virtual currencies. 
6. FinTech Diversity
FinTech encompasses numerous solutions in various financial sectors. 
In addition, the very concept of FinTech changes over time.94 As a result, 
FinTech regulation must incorporate a degree of flexibility. Several approaches 
can be envisaged: 
1.	 New product-specific regulation (i.e. development of new rules 
specifically for each FinTech product or technology);
2.	 Existing product-specific regulatory framework revised to reflect 
the emergence of a new technology (i.e. modernization of existing
rules); and 
3.	 New universal rules on FinTech (generally) that are broad enough
to operate regardless of any change of technology or product
(i.e. development of a comprehensive FinTech regime). 
Alternatively, a principles-based regulatory approach can be adopted 
for two main reasons. First, it can add flexibility to address future changes 
in technology. Second, it can be used as an interim regulatory method, while
the corresponding FinTech rules are being developed. 
42 (Jan. 2016), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sdn/2016/sdn1603.pdf [https://perma.cc/
N7ZT-8AZ4].
92. See BITCOINCASH, supra note 55. 
93. See Riksbank, supra note 90; see Bech & Garratt, supra note 90. 
94. See supra Section IV.A. 
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b. Unequal Treatment95 
1. Legislation/Regulation Favors Certain Participants 
Although financial regulation can be drafted in a neutral manner (applicable 
equally to all parties), in the FinTech context, this approach would effectively 
prioritize large financial institutions. For example, if the law characterizes 
a bank as any organization that takes deposits from a predetermined minimum 
number of people, this significantly limits the opportunities for the emergence
of non-bank crowdfunding platforms. 
This de facto priority puts pressure on regulators to establish regimes to 
favor newly created start-up businesses in order to increase the competition 
in the financial services market. However, any decision allowing preferential 
treatment needs to be based on clearly defined rules. While these rules might 
relax certain regulatory requirements for start-ups, they need to make it 
clear when businesses cease to be eligible for such treatment.
This inequality also raises another concern regarding FinTech labs operating 
within incumbent financial institutions or in association with them. Would
these innovators also be eligible for preferential treatment and on what 
grounds? In these cases, regulators may benefit from breaking internal silos
and increasing internal coordination, in order to increase regulatory efficiency
and avoid instances where different parts of the same financial institutions 
are regulated differently (which would be the case if an internal FinTech
division were offered some form of preference).
2. Balancing Risk and Reward of Regulation
Regulation should maintain a balance in terms of perceived risk and reward.
Disparities cause confusion and may stifle the development of the FinTech
industry. For example, if regulation is structured in such a way that banking
rules end up applying to peer-to-peer lending platforms, but do not confer 
a full banking status to these businesses, such platforms may be forced to 
exit the market or restructure the business so they can apply for a banking 
license.
95. According to Tom Bingham, “[t]he laws of the land should apply equally to all, 
save to the extent that objective differences justify differentiation.” See BINGHAM, supra
note 68, at 55. 
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3. Selecting Technologies and Sectors Eligible for Regulatory Support 
In some regions, local demand may be insufficient for FinTech companies
to sustain and further develop their businesses. Regulators have different
options in this case: create a preferential regime for a number of businesses
or focus on building consumer demand for the new technology (or both).96 
4. Access to Existing Infrastructure
Lack of openness, such as access to banks’ APIs,97 and lack of interoperability
between systems may significantly reduce the ability to scale certain FinTech 
businesses, particularly in the payments sector.
5. Preferential Treatment/Participation in Regulatory Sandboxes 
For a variety of reasons98 regulators may engage in FinTech promotion.
A recent example of such activity is the creation of regulatory sandboxes.99 
Different regulators around the globe are establishing sandboxes to foster 
FinTech, allowing innovators to test their concepts in a deregulated environment 
or with certain regulatory preferences that are not enjoyed by the rest of 
the market.100 Examples of the latter include exemptions from holding the
financial services or credit licenses offered by the ASIC in Australia.101 
The concept of a FinTech sandbox is still new, and regulators apply
different approaches.102 However, the criteria for selecting businesses
eligible for any preferential regime should be clear and devoid of regulatory
arbitrariness. Otherwise, the preferences obtained by the select few may
be seen as unfair advantage. 
96. See Ross P. Buckley & Louise Malady, Building Consumer Demand for Digital 
Financial Services–The New Regulatory Frontier, J. FIN. PERSP.: FINTECH 122 (Winter 2015).
97. An application programming interface (“API”) is a set of routines, protocols, 
and tools for building software applications.
98. See discussion supra V.A.
 99. See discussion supra IV.B.
 100. See  AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, TESTING FINTECH PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
WITHOUT HOLDING AN AFS OR CREDIT LICENCE 34 (2017). 
101. Id.
 102. See Herbert Smith Freehills, Hong Kong Launches Regulatory Sandbox in Wake of
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c. Limits on the Exercise of Power103 
1. Regulator’s Mandate and Authority to Regulate FinTech 
FinTech solutions may be based on technology that is developed by 
private parties without any involvement of the state, such as non-state
virtual currencies. As a result, regulatory intervention is possible only
where the regulator is mandated, both in terms of the scope of regulation 
and as regards the territory to which the regulation applies. But, the
underlying problems are many. First, in federal states both the federal and
state regulators cannot overstep their respective authority.104 Second, the
development of decentralized autonomous technologies, like DLT,105 
makes it particularly difficult to identify not only the competent regulator, 
but even the state with the authority to regulate.106  Finally, regulators should
have the necessary authority to pursue either, or both, of the corresponding 
objectives: economic stability (prudential oversight) and financial inclusion
(FinTech facilitation and promotion). 
3. Other Regulatory Challenges 
a. Protecting End-Users
1. Investor/Service Provider Accreditation 
A common approach to regulating potentially risky business models
involves restricting the types of investors permitted to make use of such 
models (such as by introducing the concept of “qualified investors”). In 
addition, some service providers, like financial advisors, may require certain 
special regulatory authorizations, such as a license.
103. According to Tom Bingham, “[m]inisters and public officers at all levels must exercise 
the powers conferred on them in good faith, fairly, for the purpose for which the powers 
were conferred, without exceeding the limits of such powers and not unreasonably.” See 
BINGHAM, supra note 68, at 60. 
104. See Conference of State Bank Supervisors v. Office of Comptroller of Currency
& Curry, No. 1:17-cv-00763 (D.D.C. Apr. 26, 2017). 
105. See ESMA, supra note 19. 
106. See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES, supra note 14, 
at 43 (DLT-based virtual currencies are a good example: “In the particular case of Bitcoin,
which is a decentralised peer-to-peer virtual currency scheme, there is not even a central
point of access, i.e. [sic] there is no server that could be shut down if the authorities deemed 
it necessary.”). 
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It is important to achieve balance in designing end-user protections. On 
the one hand, authorization requirements might need to be expanded to 
cover the new FinTech products, e.g. in cases when financial advisors solicit 
investment in non-state virtual currencies due to the high volatility of the 
latter. On the other hand, by imposing strict entry requirements regulators 
may regulate the masses out of the market and miss the opportunity for 
greater financial inclusion offered by FinTech. 
2. Fraud Prevention 
New technology can be abused by unscrupulous businesses due to the
fact that its exact workings may be unclear for the end-users.107 Fraud-
related risks may greatly discourage future investors in sectors where
regulators have failed to prevent misconduct (e.g. Ezubao108 in China or
TrustBuddy109 in Sweden). 
Fraud prevention is one of those regulatory objectives which apply across 
the whole financial sector, regardless of the technology used. However,
regulation is not always drafted broadly enough to capture new and unexpected
technological developments. In the absence of a principles-based approach to
regulation, adjustment of fraud prevention rules can take time and eventually
come too late. 
b. Ancillary Laws/Regulations 
1. Ensuring Ease of Doing Business
General business regulations affect all companies, but certain areas
of general regulation can be identified as particularly relevant to FinTech
companies: immigration regime and access to talent, ease of setting up a 
business, tax policies, ease and cost of enforcing contracts, and exchange 
controls.110 
107. For example, see a warning issued by the SEC in relation to fraudulent schemes 
involving virtual currencies, SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Investor Alert: Ponzi Schemes Using 
Virtual Currencies, SEC Pub. No. 153 (7/13), https://www.sec.gov/investor/alerts/ia_ 
virtualcurrencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZX8-PHK6].
108. See WORLD ECON. FORUM, Complex Regulatory Landscape, supra note 22. 
109. J.D. Alois, TrustBuddy Bankruptcy: Lenders to Pay 25% on Recovered Claims, 
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/01/80598­
trustbuddy-bankruptcy-lenders-to-pay-25-on-recovered-claims/ [https://perma.cc/45EX-46AY].
110. For relevance of various general business factors in the context of FinTech
development see, e.g., A Tale of 44 Cities: Connecting Global FinTech: Interim Hub Review
2017, DELOITTE 10 (Apr. 2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/ Deloitte/uk/Documents/
Innovation/deloitte-uk-connecting-global-fintech-hub-federation-innotribe-innovate­
finance.pdf [https://perma.cc/4GBU-4V3U]; UK FinTech: On the Cutting Edge: An Evaluation
of the International FinTech Sector, EY 8-9 (2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/
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2. Data Privacy and Data Protection 
FinTech businesses are often data-intensive. As a result, data protection 
rules are critical for their operation. Piecemeal privacy laws are often hard 
to navigate and fail to deal with the tension between a desire for greater
openness/sharing of data and a preference towards exercising greater control 
over valuable data. In addition, FinTech operations are often international, 
which creates implications for cross-border movement of data among states. 
The protection of one’s privacy is not merely an ethical issue: the importance
of the right to privacy is recognized in the fundamental international human 
rights treaties.111 Data protection has another dimension: vulnerabilities of
critical data may jeopardize national security. 
3. Know Your Customer/Anti-Money Laundering/Countering the 
Financing of Terrorism Requirements 
FinTech companies, particularly those engaged in online lending or operations 
with virtual currencies, often encounter obstacles when opening bank accounts 
and dealing with know your customer, anti-money laundering (“AML”), 
or countering the financing of terrorism (“CFT”)  requirements.112 Despite
the recent developments in tracking end-users, including special systems
designed to increase the transparency of operations with virtual currencies,113 
anonymity remains one of the key sources of concern for regulators.114 For
example, neither Bitcoin addresses nor Bitcoin protocol implement client
vwLUAssets/EY-UK-FinTech-On-the-cutting-edge/$FILE/EY-UK-FinTech-On-the-cutting­
edge.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7ZX-AJRT].
111. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 12, G.A. Res. 217 (III)
A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); European Convention on Human Rights, 
Art. 8, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1950). 
112. See Martin Arnold, Cryptocurrency companies forced to bank outside UK, 
FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 22, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/3853358e-b508-11e7­
a398-73d59db9e399. In its 2017 FinTech study, the International Monetary Fund (“IMF”)
notes that “[g]iven their pseudo-anonymous nature where the identities of participants in a 
transaction are not known, cryptocurrencies do give rise to significant money-laundering
and terrorist-financing risks.” See INT’L MONETARY FUND, Fintech and Financial Services:
Initial Considerations 16 n.7 (June 16, 2017), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Staff­
Discussion-Notes/Issues/2017/06/16/Fintech-and-Financial-Services-Initial-Considerations­
44985 [https://perma.cc/39FR-2MDE].
113. See generally ELLIPTIC, https://www.elliptic.co/ [https://perma.cc/K3KV-BSGV] 
(last visited Apr. 14, 2018). 
114. See, e.g., EUROPEAN CENT. BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES: A FURTHER
ANALYSIS, supra note 14, at 28. 
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c. Organizational Matters 
1. Decentralized Nature of FinTech 
Regulators are used to dealing with industries that are internally uniform.
However, FinTech is very decentralized, since it encompasses a large variety 
of businesses utilizing different technologies, and thus often does not have
a single industry “voice.” 
In practical terms, it is much easier to deal with a FinTech “hub” based
on location, rather than a certain product-specific group of businesses. A 
prominent example is Bitcoin,116 where there is no centralized control, 
meaning regulators face difficulties interacting with the users of the technology 
and options for direct dialogue are limited. 
As a result, regulators and FinTech businesses need to maintain dialogue
to ensure that FinTech regulation remains adequate. However, important 
practical questions must be answered first. Should the dialogue be permanent 
or conducted on an ad hoc basis? How often should the regulators reconvene 
with the FinTech sector and in what format?
2. Holdout Start-Ups 
Many FinTech businesses are start-ups that prefer to stay under the 
regulator’s radar. Unlike financial institutions (e.g. banks), they are not
used to operating in constant dialogue with the regulator. This lack of 
continuous communication creates issues for the regulators attempting to 
engage with the FinTech businesses in respect of new initiatives (such as 
sandboxes, offers of assistance, FinTech weekends etc.). 
3. Catching Up with the Development of Technology and Timely 
Identification of Systemic Risks 
In order to provide an adequate response, regulators cannot afford to
fall behind the developments in technology. Two separate issues can be 
identified in this context. First, how can regulators remain up-to-date with
 115. See FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, Virtual Currencies: Key Definitions and Potential 
AML/CFT Risks 9–10 (June 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/
Virtual-currency-key-definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/XA89­
9REH].
116. See supra note 27. 
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the developments in technology and its applications? Second, can new 
technology be used to prevent systemic risks or solve regulatory challenges?
FinTech allows businesses to grow at an unprecedented pace, quickening 
the transition from “too small to care” to “too big to fail.” A very fast
development cycle imposes additional pressure on regulators and can create
incentives to adopt new regulations or take individual action.117 One of 
the most recent examples of this growth and resulting government action
comes from China: in the light of the growing number of ICOs organized
domestically and around the globe, the People’s Bank of China declared
a full ban on this model of raising finance, stressing the risky nature of the
underlying investment.118 
This “speed of change” challenge is particularly relevant in countries
with large amounts of unbanked population, where FinTech takes up the 
space previously not taken by anyone else and is, consequently, capable
of growing at enormous speeds. 
There are several channels of systemic risk in the FinTech area. On the 
one hand, certain FinTech structures already carry the potential for systemic
disruption in the future (e.g. marketplace lending could develop the same 
instruments and mechanisms which attributed to the recent global financial 
crisis). On the other hand, if banks use FinTech channels to offer their 
services in unregulated areas and, in doing so, multiply their own risks, 
this may jeopardize the stability of the banking system as a whole. 
Finally, in some jurisdictions larger FinTech businesses have such a
significant market share that their failure may have serious negative 
consequences for the overall financial system.119 It may be helpful to consider
whether such businesses should be designated as systemically important
and apply higher standards of supervision.
4. Adjustment of Existing Laws 
In view of the constant development of technology and financing mechanisms, 
regulators need to ensure that applicable rules are adjusted accordingly 
117. The best example is perhaps Alibaba’s Yu’E Bao, currently the largest money
market fund in the world, which was started only in 2014, and was already among the top 
four funds in just nine months. See Zetzsche et. al., supra note 41, at 17. 
118. Karishma Vaswani, China Bans Initial Coin Offerings Calling Them “Illegal 
Fundraising”, BBC NEWS (Sept. 5, 2017), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-41157249 
[https://perma.cc/7HZQ-ZRUB]. 
119. The dominant mobile money provider in Kenya, M-Pesa, can be used as an example.
See discussion infra Section VII.B.3.a. 
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(either by way of constant revision, by relying on principles-based regulation 
or otherwise). As part of this revision process, regulators should determine
whether the objectives of regulation can be achieved by adjusting the existing 
regulatory structure or by developing dedicated, FinTech-specific, rules. 
5. Insufficient Intra-State Cooperation Among Regulators 
The lack of effective cooperation between different types of regulators results 
in uncertainty and confusion and may very likely discourage innovators. 
Conflicts and overlaps may exist on an industry level (e.g. between central 
banks and communications authorities), as well as on a constitutional level 
(e.g. between federal and state regulators). 
Absence of cooperation among regulators may significantly reduce the 
effectiveness of certain regulatory measures, like no-action letters: a business
receiving positive or neutral treatment from one regulator may still be open 
to a challenge from another.120 
6. Lack of International Regulatory Coordination
Many FinTech business models are transnational by nature. A prime
example is DLT,121 which does not have a single center from which it operates, 
making it particularly difficult to design national regulatory measures. It 
is conceivable that in such areas international cooperation is capable
of producing the most consistent regulatory response.122 
A number of jurisdictions have already initiated the process of international 
FinTech-related regulatory cooperation, by establishing FinTech “bridges”
and signing Memoranda of Understanding with regulators in other countries.123 
VI. GLOBAL TRENDS IN FINTECH REGULATION
There is no universal approach to the regulation of FinTech; regulators
adopt very different measures to address technological innovation in finance.
Nevertheless, a number of international trends can be identified. 
120. For example, see Letter from Consumer Financial Protection Bureau to Paul 
Hastings, LLP (Sept. 14, 2017), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201709_ 
cfpb_upstart-no-action-letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/B3LL-SVUM]. This No-Action Letter
is not issued by or on behalf of any other government agency or any other person and is not
intended to be honored or deferred to in any way by any court or any other government 
agency or person. 
121. See supra note 19. 
122. If conflict of law rules end up being inappropriate in the context of a specific
technology, international regulation on a substantive level might be warranted.
123. See discussion infra.
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First, national regulators adopt various techniques to gain better understanding 
of FinTech and its potential implications. These include the establishment
of dedicated working groups and consultation platforms; for example,
there is the Distributed Ledger Technology Working Group established by
the SEC,124 the newly created LabCFTC in the U.S.,125 the committee on 
financial technology set up by the People’s Bank of China,126 or the special 
working group on blockchain at the Bank of Russia.127 Additionally, countries
have formed roundtables and thematic workshops; the UK in particular 
has the International FinTech Conference, sponsored by the UK Department
for International Trade,128 and the themed weeks on robo-advice, payments
and InsurTech organized by the FCA.129 
Second, as the regulators’ familiarity with the new technology increases, 
the scope and methods of their engagement with FinTech change accordingly.
For example, the SEC Distributed Ledger Technology Working Group in 
the US initially started as a Digital Currency Working Group in 2013 but 
has significantly expanded the scope of its work to cover DLT as a whole. 
Third, domestic regulators engage in international cooperation and 
coordination in the FinTech area. Examples include various cooperation 
agreements, or “FinTech bridges,” and Memoranda of Understanding.  Since 
2016, regulators from Abu Dhabi, Australia, Canada, China, France, Hong
Kong, India, Japan, Kenya, Singapore, South Korea, Switzerland and the
UK have entered into these agreements.130 
Fourth, regulators are establishing domestic hubs to foster the development 
of FinTech. Some of the notable examples include the ASIC Innovation 
124. See SEC Fintech Forum, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/fintech [https:// 
perma.cc/KAX7-RNDB].
125. Press Release, CFTC, CFTC Launches LabCFTC as Major FinTech Initiative 
(May 17, 2017), http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/PressReleases/pr7558-17 [https://perma.
cc/RN57-4SSZ].
126. Hudson Lockett, China’s Central Bank Establishes Fintech Committee, FIN.
TIMES (May 14, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/5df262c8-a37e-3e04-aeb2-2f6b29ba4411. 
127. ЦБ РФ создал рабочую группу по изучению технологии blockchain [The CB 
of the RF Has Created a Working Group to Study the Blockchain Technology], INTERFAX
(Sept. 18, 2015), http://www.interfax.ru/business/467647 [https://perma.cc/Z84S-KGGS].
128. International FinTech Conference 2017, UK DEP’T FOR INT’L TRADE, https://
www.events.trade.gov.uk/fintech-conference-2017/ [https://perma.cc/F6BT-LKAX].
129. Innovate: Themed Weeks, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., (May 4, 2017), https://www.fca. 
org.uk/firms/innovate-innovation-hub/themed-weeks [https://perma.cc/T4K3-HGYA].
130. A Tale of 44 Cities, supra note 110, at 21. 
 347





























    
 
   
 
  
   
 
 
   
  
  
   
 
Hub in Australia,131  the FCA Innovation Hub in the UK,132 and the MAS
FinTech Innovation Lab in Singapore133 
Fifth, supranational and international bodies are becoming increasingly 
involved in the regulation of FinTech. The European Commission announced
the establishment of the Financial Technology Task Force in 2016,134 followed 
by a public consultation on FinTech in 2017.135 The FSB established the
Financial Innovation Network to look at FinTech innovation from the 
perspective of financial stability and published its report in June 2017.136 
The International Organization of Securities Commissions (“IOSCO”) published
its Research Report on Financial Technologies in February 2017.137 
In August 2017, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision released a 
consultation paper on the implications of FinTech for the financial sector,
which remained open for comment until the end of October 2017.138 The 
IMF also joined the FinTech debate with its report published in June 2017.139 
Despite the variety of approaches to regulate FinTech140 and attempts
to identify the leaders in this area,141 existing regulatory frameworks have
 131. Innovation Hub, AUSTL. SEC. & INV. COMM’N, http://asic.gov.au/for-business/
your-business/innovation-hub/ [https://perma.cc/V63E-5UGM].
132. Innovate and Innovation Hub, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., (May 11, 2015), https:// 
www.fca.org.uk/firms/innovate-innovation-hub [https://perma.cc/JW8V-NNJ9].
133. MAS Establishes FinTech Innovation Lab,  MONETARY AUTH. OF SINGAPORE, 
(Aug. 24, 2016), http://www.mas.gov.sg/News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2016/
MAS-establishes-FinTech-Innovation-Lab.aspx [https://perma.cc/NF3U-F2DE].
134. Roberto Viola & Oliver Guersent, European Commission Sets Up an Internal 
Task Force on Financial Technology, EUROPEAN COMM’N, (Nov. 14, 2016), https://ec.europa.eu/
digital-single-market/en/blog/european-commission-sets-internal-task-force-financial­
technology [https://perma.cc/D695-PEYJ].
135. See EUROPEAN COMM’N, supra note 37. 
136. See generally Monitoring of FinTech, FIN. STABILITY BD., http://www.fsb.org/
what-we-do/policy-development/additional-policy-areas/monitoring-of-fintech/ [https://perma.cc/
24RJ-QU2X] (last visited Feb. 16, 2018); see also FIN. STABILITY BD., supra note 36. 
137. IOSCO, supra note 78. 
138. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Sound Practices: Implications of
Fintech Developments for Banks and Bank Supervisors Consultative Document, BANK FOR
INT’L SETTLEMENTS, (Aug. 2017), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d415.pdf [https://perma.cc/
BS47-K9W8].
139. INT’L MONETARY FUND, supra note 112. 
140. See, e.g., International Comparative FinTech Overview: How the FinTech




141. See, e.g., A Tale of 44 Cities, supra note 110; UK FinTech: On the Cutting Edge: 
An Evaluation of the International FinTech Sector, EY (2016), http://www.ey.com/Publication/ 
vwLUAssets/EY-UK-FinTech-On-the-cutting-edge/$FILE/EY-UK-FinTech-On-the-cutting- 
edge.pdf [https://perma.cc/K7ZX-AJRT]; see The FinTech Index: Assessing Digital and
Financial Inclusion in Developing and Emerging Countries, ING (Nov. 2016), https://www.
ing.nl/media/ING_EBZ_fintech-index-report_tcm162-116078.pdf [https://perma.cc/3YZ5-JH8L].
348
DIDENKO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/2018 3:03 PM      
 














   
 
 
[VOL. 19:  311, 2018] Regulating FinTech 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
not matured enough to identify “best practices.” Many underlying challenges142 
remain unresolved. Thus, any existing practices, particularly in the rule of
law dimension, should be considered carefully.
Even where regulators have not formulated their policies in relation to 
FinTech, they often give informal signals to the industry, indicating that 
the authorities are in “listening mode.” A number of governments and 
regulators (e.g. in Australia,143 the UK,144 the US145) have gone further and
listed their respective priorities in the area of FinTech regulation. 
142. See supra Section V.B. 
143. See Australia’s FinTech Priorities, AUSTL. GOV’T TREASURY, https://fintech. 
treasury.gov.au/australias-fintech-priorities/ [https://perma. cc/5NQV-9CE9] (last visited
Feb. 16, 2018). 
144. See Mark Walport, FinTech Futures: The UK as a World Leader in Financial 
Technologies, GOV’T OFF. SCI. 1–13 (Mar. 2015), https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/ 
system/uploads/attachment_data/file/413095/gs-15-3-fintech-futures.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/3BYP-8GKD]; Business Plan 2017/18, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., https://www.fca. org.uk/ 
publication/business-plans/business-plan-2017-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/BK3R-UU9K]. 
145. Supporting Responsible Innovation in the Federal Banking System: An OCC 



















   





   
 
 









   
 
VII. REGULATION OF FINTECH IN KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA146 
A. Kenya and South Africa as Key FinTech  

Jurisdictions in the Region 

1. The Role of FinTech in Sub-Saharan Africa 

The majority of the adult population in Sub-Saharan Africa is unbanked.147 
In absolute figures, over 340 million adults do not have a bank account.148 
Africa’s banking sector is held back by factors like currency fluctuations 
and a low supply of products for savings, insurance, credit, and payment
transactions.149 
FinTech plays a distinct role in the region. In many cases FinTech solutions
appear in  areas where traditional banks  have been unprofitable and financial
inclusion opportunities have not existed before.150 This disparity forms the
basis for the favorable perception of FinTech, both among the general 
population and among the incumbent financial institutions, which can
cooperate with the emerging FinTech businesses to cover a larger portion 
146. A large portion of this section is based on a similar consolidated piece published
by the British Institute of International and Comparative Law. See DR. ANTON DIDENKO,
BINGHAM CTR. FOR THE RULE OF LAW, REGULATORY CHALLENGES UNDERLYING FINTECH 
IN KENYA AND SOUTH AFRICA (2017), https://www.biicl.org/documents/1814 
_regulation_of_fintech_in_kenya_and_south_africa_v_1.pdf?showdocument=1 
[https://perma.cc/NEV5- 5RYJ].
Editor’s Note: Express permission was provided to the author to reproduce the data in
the above in the present article and a permission email is on file with the journal. 
147. Asli Demirguc-Kunt, et. al., The Global Findex Database 2014: Measuring Financial 
Inclusion around the World, 13 (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7255), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/187761468179367706/pdf/WPS7255.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C8UQ-RAXR]. According to the revised data published by the World 
Bank in 2018, the percentage of unbanked population in Sub-Saharan Africa has reduced, 
albeit slightly: only 33% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa aged above 15 years old 
own a financial institution account (compared to 29% in 2014). Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, 
Leora Klapper, Dorothe Singer, Saniya Ansar, and Jake Hess. 2018. The Global Findex 
Database 2017: Measuring Financial Inclusion and the Fintech Revolution. Washington,
DC: World Bank. 
148. WORLD BANK GRP., The Little Data Book on Financial Inclusion 2015, ISSUU
9 (2015), https://issuu.com/world.bank.publications/docs/9781464805523 [https://perma.cc/ 
24CD-DJMQ]; see also Juan Pedro Moreno et al.; Banking: Billion Reasons to Bank Inclusively, 
ACCENTURE 7, https://www.accenture.com/us-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/Conversion-Assets/Dot 
Com/Documents/Global/PDF/Dualpub_22/Accenture-billion-reasons-bank-inclusively.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/GJQ4-M64G].
149. INT’L FIN. CORP., How Fintech Is Reaching the Poor in Africa and Asia: A Start-Up
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of the market.151 In addition, there has been no major FinTech-related 
crisis in the region, resulting in an overall pro-FinTech sentiment. In contrast, 
a common perception exists in these areas that banking is for the rich, and
standard banking procedures like opening a bank account can be “painfully
bureaucratic.”152 In this capacity, FinTech opens the door to bridging the
gap between the “poor” and the middle class.
At a recent pan-African conference, FinTech companies were listed as
a key future driver of financial inclusion in the African region, alongside 
telecommunications companies, banks, messenger platforms and online 
retailers.153 African demographics, with young people making up a large
proportion of the population, are another important factor in FinTech
promotion.154 
Despite the lack of wealth in the region, Sub-Saharan Africa is among 
the world leaders in mobile money usage.155 According to a recent study, 
the 13 countries with the highest mobile money user bases in proportion 
to the population were all located in Sub-Saharan Africa.156 
At the same time, the number of highly successful FinTech businesses
in the region remains low. A recent Deloitte study listed the low levels of
 151. Id. 
152. Id.
 153. BOWMANS, supra note 80, at 5. For additional references to the positive disruptive 
effects brought by FinTech, see, e.g., Koffi, supra note 13. 
154. See U.N. DEP’T OF INT’L ECON. & SOC. AFFAIRS, WORLD POPULATION PROSPECTS:
THE 2017 REVISION, at Index line 155 row AZ, U.N. Doc. POP/9-1 (June 2017). The data 
suggests that over 60% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa is under 25 years old.  At 
the same time, the percentage of “digital natives,” i.e. those with five or more years of
online experience remains much lower in the region (under 10%) compared to the world 
average of 30%. See  UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, THE POWER OF 1.8 BILLION:
ADOLESCENTS, YOUTH AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FUTURE 44, U.N. Doc. E/9500/2014, 
U.N. Sales No. E.14.III.H.1, 44, https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/EN­
SWOP14-Report_FINAL-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9QH-R262]. 
155. Ronit Ghose et al., Digital Disruption: How FinTech is Forcing Banking to a
Tipping Point 48 (Mar. 2016), https://ir.citi.com/D%2F5GCKN6uoSvhbvCmUDS05SYsRa 
DvAykPjb5subGr7f1JMe8w2oX1bqpFm6RdjSRSpGzSaXhyXY%3D [https://perma.cc/
96PU-CMTM].
156. According to the World Bank data, “21 percent of adults now have a mobile money
account—nearly twice the share in 2014”, and these numbers are “easily the highest of
any region in the world.” Demirgüç-Kunt et al., Global Findex Database 2017, supra note 
147, at xi. Also noted by the World Bank data, all 10 countries in the world where the 
proportion of adults who own a mobile money account exceeds the number of adults with
a financial institution account are located in Sub-Saharan Africa. These countries are 
Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Kenya, Mali, Senegal, Tanzania, Uganda, and 
Zimbabwe. Id. at 20. 
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2. Kenya and South Africa as Regional FinTech Centers 
Kenya and South Africa stand out as the region’s leaders not only in terms
of financial inclusion, with the vast majority of the adult population having
access to a bank or mobile money account,158 but also as major FinTech 
centers. Until the recent revision of the list of the global FinTech hubs 
prepared by Deloitte, Johannesburg and Nairobi were the only cities on
the African continent included in the list; now Lagos joins that list.159 
Kenya and South Africa are the regional leaders in various FinTech
spaces.160 Kenya is one of the world leaders in mobile money and home
to perhaps the most well-known example of FinTech-based financial inclusion, 
M-Pesa.161 The share of the adult population in the country with a mobile
money account exceeds 70%.162 In contrast, in South Africa, where consumers
have much better access to bank accounts and cash out facilities,163 the
incentives for mobile money were lower and M-Pesa was discontinued in 
June 2016.164 Shortly afterwards MTN, Africa’s biggest wireless phone
group, also scrapped its mobile money business in the jurisdiction, stating 
that the operating costs of running a mobile money platform had become 
“prohibitive.”165 Kenya and South Africa are the market leaders in raising 
online alternative finance: in 2015 they raised, respectively, USD 16.7 
million and USD 15 million from online channels.166 In addition, the two
 157. A Tale of 44 Cities, supra note 110, at 16; see also ING, supra note 141, at 8. 
158. WORLDBANK,The Global Findex Database 2017, https://globalfindex.worldbank.org/#
data_sec_focus (last visited May 30, 2018) (data accessed through excel worksheet on website).
159. A Tale of 44 Cities, supra note 110, at 17. 
160. Christie Uzebu, The Rise and Rise of FinTech in Africa, CPAFRICA, https://
www.cp-africa.com/2018/01/30/rise-rise-fintech-africa/ [https://perma.cc/UL62-NMND].
161. Id.
162. Demirguc- Kunt et. al., The Global Findex Database 2017, supra note 147, at 20. 
163. See, e.g., Buckley & Malady, supra note 96, at 11. 
164. See Vodacom to Discontinue M-Pesa in South Africa, VODACOM, http://www. 
vodacom.com/news-article.php?articleID=3268 [https://perma.cc/29JJ-Y346] (last visited Feb. 
16, 2018). 
165. MTN Scraps Mobile Money Business in South Africa, REUTERS (Sept. 15, 2016), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mtn-group-divestiture/mtn-scraps-mobile-money­
business-in-south-africa-idUSKCN11L22B?il=0 [https://perma.cc/JU3R-38LX]. 
166. CAMBRIDGE CENTRE FOR ALTERNATIVE FINANCE & ENERGY 4 IMPACT, THE AFRICA
AND MIDDLE EAST ALTERNATIVE FINANCE BENCHMARKING REPORT 13 (Feb. 2017), https://
www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/centres/alternative-finance/downloads/
2017- africa-middle-east-alternative-finance-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/P36Q-GHVZ. 
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countries host the largest number of technology hubs in Africa, according 
to the GSMA.167 
B. Some Observations Relating to FinTech Regulation in 

Kenya and South Africa
 
Analysis of existing publications and discussions with the various stakeholders 
in Kenya and South Africa helped to formulate a number of observations 
relating to the development of FinTech regulation in these countries.
Some of these observations are relevant for both countries, while others 
are more jurisdiction-specific. The list below is not exhaustive, but only
aims to flag the most pertinent matters in FinTech regulation that will 
form the basis of the suggestions proposed, infra, for the improvement of 
the regulatory framework. 
1. General Observations for Both Kenya and South Africa 
a. No Uniform Approach to Defining FinTech 
As mentioned, the understanding of the term FinTech varies greatly within
the industry. Some commentators treat FinTech as any new application of 
technology to existing financial products. Under this approach, not only
the breakthrough technologies, but even a simple transition from paper-
based to electronic means of product or service delivery would fall within
the ambit of the term. Others call for a more restrictive approach to defining 
FinTech. 
b. No Centralized Approach to FinTech Regulation
Both countries have no single FinTech-specific statute or regulation. FinTech
businesses are regulated by a variety of statutes and rules governing
different financial products, services and market participants, as well as 
other more general provisions (e.g. company laws, electronic communications 
laws etc.).168
 167. GSMA Intelligence, Mobile Delivering Growth and Innovation Across Africa, 
THE MOBILE ECONOMY: AFRICA 2016, 25 (2016), https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/
research/?file=3bc21ea879a5b217b64d62fa24c55bdf&download [https://perma.cc/QHS8-ACFF].
168. See discussion infra.
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c. No Single Regulatory Policy on FinTech 
Instead of formulating a single set of regulatory priorities related to FinTech, 
regulators generally respond to the more pressing issues individually, as 
the need arises. This can be illustrated by the banking authorities’ response in
both countries to the risks associated with virtual currencies, in the form 
of a position paper by the South African Reserve Bank (“SARB”)169 and 
notices to the public170 and to the financial institutions171 by the Central 
Bank of Kenya.
d. Interest in FinTech Sandboxes 
There is a rising interest in the concept of regulatory sandboxes for FinTech 
businesses. In June 2017, the Kenyan Capital Markets Authority launched 
its public consultation on the first proposed regulatory framework applicable
to sandboxes in the jurisdiction.172 In South Africa, there is evidence of 
ongoing discussions regarding setting up a regulatory sandbox in the future.173 
e. Potential for New Principles-Based Regulation 
In designing FinTech regulations, both jurisdictions are developing principles- 
based legal norms. In South Africa, the Protection of Personal Information 
Act (“POPI”) imposes eight principles on entities processing personal
information.174 Other instruments also apply a principles-based approach. 




170. Public Notice: Caution to the Public on Virtual Currencies Such as Bitcoin, 
CENT. BANK OF KENYA (Dec. 2015), https://www.centralbank.go.ke/images/docs/media/ 
Public_Notice_on_virtual_currencies_such_as_Bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/B662-Z3T4].
171. Banking Circular No. 14 of 2015: Virtual Currencies - Bitcoin, CENT. BANK
OF KENYA (Dec. 18, 2015) https://www.centralbank.go.ke/uploads/banking_circulars/ 
2075994161_Banking%20Circular%20No%2014%20of%202015%20%20Virtual%20Curren
cies%20-%20 Bitcoin.pdf [https://perma.cc/E2E4-TS3M].
172. Stakeholders’ Consultative Paper on Policy Framework for Implementation of
a Regulatory Sandbox to Support Financial Technology (Fintech) Innovation in the Capital
Markets in Kenya, CAP. MKT. AUTH. (June  (2017), https://www.cma.or.ke/index.php/news-and-
publications/press-center/353-stakeholders-consultative-paper-on-policy-framework-for­
implementation-of-regulatory-sandbox-to-support-financial-technology-fintech-innovation­
in-the-capital-markets-in-kenya [http://perma.cc/VHR8-QYDT] [hereinafter Stakeholders’
Consultative Paper].
173. Reserve Bank to Begin Testing Bitcoin and Cryptocurrency Regulations, BUSINESSTECH
(July 19, 2017), https://businesstech.co.za/news/finance/186533/sa-reserve-bank-to­
begin-testing-bitcoin-and-cryptocurrency-regulations/ [https://perma.cc/P99G-7C7L]. 
174. These principles are: (i) accountability, (ii) processing limitation, (iii) purpose 
specification, (iv) further processing limitation, (v) information quality, (vi) openness, 
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Examples include the Financial Sector Regulation Act, Treating Customers
Fairly, and the Retail Distribution Review.175 In Kenya, the recent sandbox 
consultation document expressly states that “regulatory nimbleness, flexibility
and responsiveness provided by principle-based regulation is even more
important in the FinTech sector where thriving innovation is the lifeline
of a vibrant business enterprise.”176 
f. Cybercrime Risks
In a 2016 cybercrime and cybersecurity study by Symantec, Kenya and 
South Africa were among the highest Sub-Saharan Africa countries in 
terms of cyber-attack numbers, malware, spam, and phishing hosts.177 In an 
earlier study, South Africa was listed as having the third highest number of 
cybercrime victims worldwide.178 According to the Global Economic
Crime Survey, prepared by PWC in 2016, 32% of South African organizations 
reported being victims of cybercrime, while “most organizations [were]
still not adequately prepared for, or even [understood] the risks they [faced].”179 
Research by Serianu shows that over 70% of people in Kenya have
experienced cybercrime.180 Both countries are lacking a comprehensive
cybercrime legal framework, but the legislative reform is underway; in
Kenya, the Computer and Cybercrimes Bill was published in the Kenya 
(vii) security safeguards and (viii) data subject specification. See Section 4(1)(a)-(h) of the 
Protection of Personal Information Act of 2013 § 4(1)(a)-(h). It should be noted that, while 
POPI was not fully implemented at the time of writing this paper, the new data protection 
authority—the Information Regulator—was established pursuant to Section 39. Protection 
of Personal Information Act of 2014 § 39. In addition, the President of South Africa
appointed the Chairperson and members of the Information Regulator with effect from 
December 1, 2016, for a period of five years. INFORMATION REGULATOR (SOUTH AFRICA),
http://www.justice.gov.za/inforeg/ [https://perma.cc/3PT7-FG6P] (last visited Feb. 16, 2018).
175. Bowmans, supra note 80, at 10. 
176. Stakeholders’ Consultative Paper, supra note 172, at 2 (emphasis added). 
177. Cyber Crime & Cyber Security: Trends in Africa, SYMANTEC 25–28 (Nov. 2016),
https://www.thehaguesecuritydelta.com/media/com_hsd/report/135/document/Cyber­
security-trends-report-Africa-en.pdf [https://perma.cc/F4D9-XF3U].
178. SA Ranks World’s Third Highest Cybercrime Victims, BUS. MEDIA MAGS (2016),
http://businessmediamags.co.za/sa-ranks-worlds-third-highest-cybercrime-victims-2/ [https://
perma.cc/9TV2-TPMW].
179. PWC, Global Economic Crime Survey 2016 2 (Mar. 2016), https://www. pwc.co.
za/en/assets/pdf/south-african-crime-survey-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/DM3H-ES8Z]. 
180. SERIANU, Africa Cyber Security Report 2016 30 (2016), http://www.serianu. 
com/downloads/AfricaCyberSecurityReport2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/4SVP-9Z2Y].
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2. South Africa 
While there is no overarching FinTech-oriented regulatory framework
in South Africa, the country has a developed financial services regulation 
in place, including the Banks Act (governing banks), the Financial Advisory 
and Intermediary Services Act (governing the provision of financial advice)
and the Financial Markets Act (governing specific financial products and
securities).183 The regulation of financial services is undergoing a significant
change: the Financial Sector Regulation Act, which was signed by the President 
into law in August 2017,184 introduces two brand new regulators: the Prudential 
Authority185 and the Financial Sector Conduct Authority,186 adding an
element of uncertainty in the context of future regulation.
Some discussants observed that the sector-specific regulation in South 
Africa may create obstacles for bringing together technology companies 
and financial institutions. 
a. Social and Economic Impact Assessment 
The South African government has stressed the importance of forward-
looking regulation and ex ante analysis of the new rules. In October 2015,
South Africa introduced the new Socio-Economic Impact Assessment System 
(“SEIAS”).187 According to the published guidelines, all Cabinet Memoranda 
seeking approval for draft policies, bills, or regulations must include an impact
assessment that is signed off by a special SEIAS unit.188 An interdepartmental
Steering Committee oversees SEIAS implementation and also provides 
181. The Computer and Cybercrimes Bill, No. 29 (2017) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT 
NO. 91. 
182. Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill, GN 75 of GG 40487 (9 Dec. 2016). See 
also Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [B6–2017], PARLIMENTARY MONITORING GRP.,
https://pmg.org.za/call-for-comment/567/ [https://perma.cc/4N7C-7NPX] (last visited Mar.
30, 2018) . 
183. Banks Act 94 of 1990 (S. Afr.); Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services
Act 37 of 2002 (S. Afr.); Financial Markets Act 70 of 2013 (S. Afr.). 




Government Gazette; Republic of South Africa, GN 626 of GG 41060 (22 Aug.
Id. ch. 3. 
186. Id. ch. 4. 
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guidance and support in the implementation of SEIAS.189 The Department
of Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation (“DPME”) is responsible for the 
establishment of a SEIAS unit to ensure the implementation, quality control 
and capacity support.190 
The SEIAS procedure aims to establish a “thought-through” process
rather than a box-ticking exercise.191 The first steps in the implementation 
of the new initiative have already been made; in his 2016 Budget Speech, 
Pravin Gordhan, the former Minister of Finance of South Africa, noted the 
ongoing review of a large number of bills and plans “as part of the new 
socio-economic impact assessment programme.”192 
The concept of social and economic impact assessment will be particularly 
useful in shaping the future FinTech regulation: a comprehensive analysis 
of the potential impact of the new technologies and proposed measures to
regulate them will enhance the quality of the regulatory response and will 
allow regulators to focus on those areas where the need for intervention is 
highest.
b. Legal Status of Virtual Currencies
The regulatory approach in relation to virtual currencies is summarized 
in a Position Paper on Virtual Currencies NPS 02/2014 (Virtual Currencies
Position Paper) by the SARB.193 This document sets out the various pieces 
of legislation and analyzes virtual currencies by applying the existing concepts
and rules.194 It concludes that the SARB “does not oversee, supervise or 
regulate the [virtual currencies] landscape, systems or intermediaries
for effectiveness, soundness, integrity or robustness” and that “activities 
related to the acquisition, trading or use of [virtual currencies]. . . are performed 
at the end-user’s sole and independent risk.”195 While virtual currencies
 189. Id. at 3–4. 
190. Id. 
191. Presentation on Socio-Economic Impact Assessment System (SEIAS), DEP’T: PLAN.,
MONITORING AND EVALUATION 4 (Nov. 20, 2015), http://www.dpme.gov.za/keyfocusareas/
Socio%20Economic%20Impact%20Assessment%20System/SEIAS%20Documents/Pres
entation%20on%20SEIAS-%20Nov%202015.pdf [https://perma.cc/DZ34-RJEK].
192. Pravin Gordhan, Minister of Finance, 2016 Budget Speech (Feb. 24, 2016), 
http://www.nda.agric.za/docs/speeches/parvin%20gordan%20budgetspeech2016.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/XYJ2-B6AJ].
193. See generally Position Paper on Virtual Currencies, supra note 169. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. at 12. 
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were not considered by the SARB as posing significant risks, the regulator 
reserved the right to reverse its position in case regulatory intervention 
was required.196 
While there has been no formal revision of the Virtual Currencies Position 
Paper, in March 2016 the SARB established a “multi-disciplinary task 
team” to consider the “regulatory, supervisory and technological opportunities 
offered by block chain [sic] and distributed ledger technologies.”197 This
new working group may lead to the development of a new regulatory approach 
to cryptocurrencies in South Africa. 
Interestingly, the SARB was reported as considering the possible benefits 
of issuing a national digital currency at some point in the future,198 although 
so far, the regulator has adopted a cautious approach.199 The need to better 
understand the underlying technology and possible risks are not the only 
concerns faced by the regulator. If the idea of an electronic fiat (“e-fiat”)
currency200 issued by the central bank is indeed on the regulator’s agenda, 
this might create a tangible disincentive to regulate other cryptocurrencies
(such as Bitcoin), which may compete with the “official” e-fiat. This, in turn, 
raises the question as to who will ultimately introduce the regulatory measures 
in the digital currencies: the local regulators (with their potential disincentives
due to possible issuance of e-fiat) or the international standard-setters.201 
Unregulated cryptocurrencies do not involve AML/CFT checks, and, while 
not recognized as legal tender, they can be used to move large volumes of 
value with no real means to identify the actual transacting parties. The
question thus remains as to whether these concerns warrant regulatory
intervention. Currently, the relevant client identification rules in South 
Africa are listed in the Financial Intelligence Centre Act (FICA), which
contains a closed list of entities subject to the AML/CFT duties in Schedule 1. 
196. Id. at 12–13. 




198. See, e.g., Prinesha Naidoo, South Africa Open to Digital Currency, MONEYWEB
(Feb. 2, 2017), https://www.moneyweb.co.za/news/tech/south-africa-open-to-digital-currency/
[https://perma.cc/6JQ7-L894]. 
199. See Riksbank, supra note 90. 
200.  A currency that is not backed by a physical commodity, such as gold. 
201. In its 2016 report on virtual currencies, the IMF concluded that, “as experience 
is gained, consideration could be given to developing standards and best practices to provide 
guidance on the most appropriate regulatory responses to [virtual currency] schemes in 
different fields.” INT’L MONETARY FUND, Virtual Currencies and Beyond, supra note
91, at 36. The Financial Action Task Force’s recommendations on virtual currencies
are one of the first steps in this direction. See Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Virtual 
Currencies, FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE (June 2015), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/
documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-Virtual-Currencies. pdf [https://perma.cc/N6TM-854C].
358
DIDENKO (DO NOT DELETE) 7/25/2018 3:03 PM      
 
   
 
 
     
 


















           
 
     
  
    
 
 
    
 
  
[VOL. 19:  311, 2018] Regulating FinTech 
SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J.
To the extent that certain businesses engaged in operations with virtual
currencies are not covered by FICA, an amendment of Schedule 1 is required
to extend the relevant obligations to them.
Some of the discussants suggested that, despite the co-existence of various
regulators in South Africa (Financial Services Board, Financial Intelligence
Centre), the guidance of next steps in the regulation of virtual currencies 
is likely to come from the SARB, which sets the tone.202 Hence, unless the
SARB reverses its current hands-off approach, it is unlikely that different
regulatory measures will be adopted by the other regulators in the area of
virtual currencies. 
c. Mobile Money Regulation
The regulatory approach to mobile money is formulated in the Position 
Paper on Electronic Money NPS 01/2009, in which the SARB differentiates 
between payments made to a third person to whom the payment is due and
sending electronic value to a beneficiary who can encash that value
without any obligation to that beneficiary.203 The former activity could be
provided by non-banks as payment service, but the latter would be 
classified as “deposit-taking” under the Banks Act and require a license.204 
d. Crowdfunding Regulation
There is no bespoke crowdfunding regulation in South Africa. In its
2016 newsletter, the Financial Services Board explained that it was in the
process of analyzing the 2015 IOSCO report “SME Financing through Capital
Markets”205 to consider how to structure the crowdfunding rules.206 At the
same time, the regulator noted that existing legislation might already
202. This proposition was made orally by discussants during a roundtable on FinTech
regulation that the author organized in Johannesburg in September 2017. 




 205. SME Financing Through Capital Markets, INT’L ORG. OF SEC. COMMISSIONS (July
2017), https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD493IOSCOPD554IOSCOPD
554.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SNC-67S9].









     
 
 




    
  
     
  














   
  
 
       
    
cover crowdfunding activities, depending on their mode of operation.207 
First, the Banks Act may apply where crowdfunding involves deposit­
taking.208 Second, the Companies Act applies to companies and, in the
case of public offerings, establishes disclosure requirements.209 Third, if
investments are pooled and channeled into securities, the Collective Investment 
Schemes Control Act will apply.210 Fourth, the provision of intermediary
services or advice in relation to financial products will trigger the Financial
Advisory and Intermediary Services Act.211 Fifth, the Financial Markets 
Act applies where the online platform matches investors with issuers and
securities are traded on an over-the-counter basis.212 Sixth, if the platform
matches lenders with borrowers to provide unsecured loans, this will trigger 
the application of the National Credit Regulation Act.213 Consequently,
market participants are encouraged to adopt a pro-active approach: 
A person interested in partaking in crowdfunding activity either by offering it or as
an investor is advised to contact the [Financial Services Board] beforehand to
establish whether the activity falls within the sphere of regulation . . . as
otherwise they may fall foul of the law.214 
The Financial Services Board was reported to be considering the
feasibility of establishing specific rules for equity-based crowdfunding by 
June 30, 2017, although no changes have been introduced to date.215 
e. Organizational Matters 
Discussants at the roundtable felt that not enough dialogue took place 
between the regulators and other stakeholders in the FinTech space. While 
the possibility of industry self-regulation216 was mentioned, it was noted
that the diversity of FinTech businesses would make it problematic.
Nevertheless, the need for greater representation, or a “voice,” of the industry 









 215. Stephen Timm, FSB Misses Its Own Crowdfunding Deadline, VENTUREBURN
(July 4, 2017), http://ventureburn.com/2017/07/fsb-misses-crowdfunding-deadline/ [https://
perma.cc/HAL6-BYZC].
216. One of the most recent examples includes the establishment of the South African
Financial Blockchain Consortium, in which two regulators (the SARB and the Financial 
Services Board) participate as observers. Members, S. AFR. FIN. BLOCKCHAIN CONSORTIUM, 
http://www.safbc.co.za/members/ [https://perma.cc/NN7K-GSQ3] (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
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3. Kenya
a. Mobile Money 
Kenya is home to one of the biggest success stories in the history of 
FinTech. The mobile money platform M-Pesa, which began operation in 
2007, contributed to a dramatic increase in financial inclusion by providing 
access to financial services for the majority of the adult population in the 
country.217 According to the most recent available  statistics report by the
Communications Authority of Kenya (July-September 2017), M-Pesa 
dominates the local mobile money transfer market, with over 22.7 million 
subscriptions out of a total of 28 million, and 428 million transactions out 
of the grand total of just over 537 million.218 
The impact of the M-Pesa platform on the overall economy in Kenya is 
significant. The volume of transactions on the platform is equivalent to 
over 40% of the country’s GDP.219 The 2017 Kenyan Budget Policy Statement 
posited that in case of a possible disruption of the mobile money payment
channels “the impact would be substantial.”220 
Various attempts have been made to level the playing field for the other
market participants. In 2014, the Communications Authority of Kenya 
217. See Hughes & Lonie, supra note 6; Benjamin Ngugi, Matthew Pelowski, & 
Javier G. Ogembo, M-pesa: A Case Study of the Critical Early Adopters’ Role in the Rapid
Adoption of Mobile Money Banking in Kenya, 43 ELEC. J. ON INFO. SYS. IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES No. 1 (2010), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/j.1681-4835.2010. 
tb00307.x; Mercy W. Buku & Michael W. Meredith, Safaricom and M-Pesa in Kenya: 
Financial Inclusion and Financial Integrity, 8 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 375 (2013); Isaac 
Mbiti & David N. Weil, Mobile Banking: The Impact of M-Pesa in Kenya (Nat’l Bureau
of Econ. Research Working Paper, No. 17129), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17129.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/BWP6-XPM8]. 
218. First Quarter Sector Statistics Report for the Financial Year 2017/2018, COMM.
AUTH. OF KENYA 13 (July-Sept. 2017), http://www.ca.go.ke/images/downloads/STATISTICS/ 
Sector%20Statistics%20Report%20Q1%20%202017-18.pdf [https://perma.cc/3SJ6-HSNF].
Compare these statistics to Tanzania’s much more competitive market. Quarterly Communications
Statistics Report, TANZANIA COMM. REG. AUTH. 5 (April–June 2017), https://www.tcra.go.
tz/images/documents/telecommunication/TelCom-Statistics-June-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/
UJ6M-76UU]. 
219. Joshua Masinde, Kenya’s M-Pesa Platform Is So Successful Regulators Worry
It Could Disrupt the Economy, QUARTZ AFR. (Dec. 28, 2016), https://qz.com/873525/
safaricoms-m-pesa-has-kenyas-government-worried-what-happens-in-the-event-of-a-crash/
[https://perma.cc/ASM6-PFUA]. See also Buckley & Malady, supra note 96, at 13 n.33. 






















    
 
 
    
 
 





    









ordered Safaricom (the mobile operator which controls M-Pesa) to open 
up its network.221 This was followed by plans to ensure full interoperability
of mobile money networks in 2017222 and even proposals to separate the
mobile money business (M-Pesa) from the controlling operator earlier the 
same year.223 
b. Regulate or “Wait and See” 
During the roundtable discussions, M-Pesa’s dominant position in Kenya
was used as an example of when regulations can significantly lag behind 
the development of technology.224 At launch of M-Pesa in 2007, the Central 
Bank of Kenya only issued a “Letter of No Objection” to Safaricom;225 
the dedicated payment systems regulations were rolled out much later,226 
starting with the adoption of the National Payment System Act in 2011
and the National Payment System Regulations in 2014.227 
While it is clear that the regulation was falling behind M-Pesa’s development,
in other areas of FinTech a more forward-looking regulatory approach can
be observed. Recent examples include the warnings issued by the Central
Bank of Kenya in relation to virtual currencies. These measures are
discussed in the following paragraphs. 
221. See Buckley & Malady, supra note 96, at 20. 
222. Abdi Latif Dahir, The World’s Most Successful Mobile Money Market is Introducing
Cross-Network Transfer Systems, QUARTZ AFR. (May 11, 2017), https://qz.com/981381/
kenya-is-set-to-introduce-interoperability-for-mobile-money-transfer-among-telecommunication- 
networks/ [https://perma.cc/CP35-U5VM].
223. Muthoki Mumo, We Will Not Punish Success, Regulator Says of Safaricom, DAILY
NATION (Mar. 14, 2017), http://www.nation.co.ke/business/Telco—competition-watchdogs- 
rule-out-Safaricom-split-option/996-3850174-format-xhtml-s3vnpaz/index.html [http://perma.
cc/MF38-CD9B]. A recent pilot by Airtel and Safaricom might be the first step towards
interoperability. See Saruni Maina, Kenyans to Send and Receive Mobile Money Across 
Networks as Interoperability Pilot Kicks Off, TECH WEEZ (Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.
techweez.com/2018/01/19/mobile-money-interoperability-kenya-2/ [http://perma.cc/H2GB­
82DC].
224. Following negative publicity, the Central Bank of Kenya published a statement 
in January 2009 entitled “Mobile Phone Financial Services in Kenya,” which acknowledged
that “regulation generally lags behind innovation and a pragmatic approach [had been] adopted 
with regard to the review of M-Pesa.” Enabling Mobile Money Transfer: The Central Bank
of Kenya’s Treatment of M-Pesa, ALLIANCE FOR FIN. INCLUSION 12, https://www.afi-global. 
org/sites/default/files/publications/afi_casestudy_mpesa_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/FCZ4­
K4AS].
225. Id. at 1. 
226. See Barnabas Andiva, Mobile Financial Services and Regulation in Kenya, 
COMPETITION AUTH.OF KENYA 6–7, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/52246331e4b0a46e5f1 
b8ce5/t/5534a332e4b078bae80cbaeb/1429513010529/Barnabas+Andiva_Mobile+Money
+Kenya.pdf [https://perma.cc/E4ZK-U4CP]. 
227. See generally The National Payment System Act, No. 39 (2011) KENYA GAZETTE 
SUPPLEMENT No. 119 §§ 3, 4.
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c. Virtual Currencies
In 2015, the Central Bank of Kenya issued several clarifications concerning 
the legal status of virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin. The warning addressed 
to the general public noted:
Virtual currencies are traded in exchange platforms that tend to be unregulated 
all over the world. Consumers may, therefore, lose their money without having
any legal redress in the event these exchanges collapse or close business.228
The public notice consequently concluded that “[t]he public should therefore 
desist from transacting in Bitcoin and similar products.”229 
In a separate Circular, this time addressed to financial institutions, the
Central Bank of Kenya further stated: 
The purpose of this Circular. . .is to caution all financial institutions against dealing in
virtual currencies or transacting with entities that are engaged in virtual currencies. 
Financial institutions are expressly advised not to open accounts for any person
dealing in virtual currencies such as Bitcoin. Failure to comply with this directive 
will lead to appropriate remedial action from the Central Bank.230
It remains to be seen whether the firm position of the banking authority
will be affected in any way by the more FinTech-friendly approach of the 
other regulators. For instance, the Capital Markets Authority has recently 
confirmed the upcoming establishment of the sandboxing regime: 
The ultimate objective of the authority is to provide Fintechs [sic] in the capital
markets such as; finance smartphone “apps”; equity crowdfuning and peer-to­
peer lending platforms; robo-advice for investment; blockchain technology; big
data; crypto-currency and other finance focused technology products, with a conducive 
environment where they can test their innovations in a relaxed regulatory
environment before taking them to the market.231
d. Crowdfunding Regulation
Similar to South Africa, there is no specific crowdfunding regulation in
Kenya. As a result, a number of regulators may have the authority to regulate
various forms of crowdfunding, including the Central Bank of Kenya, the 
228. Public Notice: Caution to the Public on Virtual Currencies Such as Bitcoin, 
supra note 170. 
229. Id.
 230. Banking Circular No. 14 of 2015: Virtual–Bitcoin, supra note 171, at 1.




























     
   
    
 
  
Capital Markets Authority and the Communications Authority of Kenya.232 
A recent study by the Cambridge Centre for Alternative Finance has identified 
a number of statutes and other regulations that might apply to crowdfunding
platforms, depending on their mode of operation.233 These include: the National 
Payment Systems Act, Money Remittance Regulations, Kenya Information 
and Communications Regulations, the Microfinance Act, the Proceeds of 
Crime and Anti-Money Laundering Act, the Capital Markets Act, the Banking
Act, and the Public Offer Regulations.234 The Public Fundraising Appeals
Bill proposes additional licensing requirements in connection with fundraising 
systems.235 
e. Organizational Matters 
A number of discussants expressed concerns about the time required to
obtain regulator’s approval for start-up FinTech businesses. Others noted 
the lack of coordination among regulators and potential conflicts of 
jurisdiction in regulating FinTech. 
C. Suggestions for Developing FinTech Regulation in 

Kenya and South Africa
 
In light of the existing challenges in the regulation of FinTech discussed
in this Article and the observations concerning Kenya and South Africa, 
the following is a developed set of recommendations for the improvement 
of the regulatory framework in these jurisdictions. It is hoped that these 
suggestions will help build a regulatory regime that reflects the key rule 
of law principles, such as the need for clarity and legal certainty and equal 
treatment of different parties. In preparing these suggestions, the limited
existing literature on this subject is taken into account,236 as well as the
different regulatory objectives,237 and acknowledgement is provided that
active FinTech promotion is just one of many possible approaches. 
232. CAMBRIDGE CENTRE FOR ALTERNATIVE FINANCE & FSD AFRICA, CROWDFUNDING
IN EAST AFRICA: REGULATION AND POLICY FOR MARKET DEVELOPMENT 29–30 (Jan. 2017), 
https://www.jbs.cam.ac.uk/fileadmin/user_upload/research/centres/alternative-finance/
downloads/2017-05-eastafrica-crowdfunding-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4K7J-NEPL].
No. 28, 99. 
233. Id. 
234. Id. at 30–31. 
235. Public Fundraising Appeals Bill, No. 99 (2014) KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT
236. See, e.g., Knight, supra note 9, at 25–29; Alan McQuinn, Weining Guo &
Daniel Castro, Policy Principles for Fintech, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND. (2016),
http://www2.itif.org/2016-policy-principles-fintech.pdf [https://perma.cc/CYD7-NXVJ].
237. See discussion supra Section V.A.
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	 In the absence of dedicated (FinTech-specific) regulation, 
governments should formulate a clear set of priorities that
inform the FinTech regulatory policy. This list should be made 
available to the public and should be realistic, as over-inclusive
and mutually contradictory objectives can send mixed signals 
not only to the industry,238 but also to the regulators. In the
absence of a single approach, governments may end up 
adopting different views on the development of FinTech and
engage in regulatory competition with possible negative 
effects, such as a “race to the bottom.”
	 It is important to ensure that regulations are easily understood 
by FinTech businesses and that the regulators and regulated 
understand each other. The concern is more relevant for 
start-up businesses which operate without a financial institution’s 
support or a FinTech incubator that acts as a “translator.”
Regulators have a number of options to consider, such as
preparing written explanatory materials that are clear for 
non-specialists or making staff available for industry
consultations and encouraging contact with regulators.
	 A comprehensive social and economic impact assessment 
can be used as an effective tool in developing regulatory
priorities in the FinTech space. It can achieve a number of 
objectives, such as identifying areas with insufficient domestic
demand or selecting the sector, technology or solution with 
the highest potential gain for the economy. An effective
social and economic impact assessment should:
1.	 be comprehensive, avoiding a “tick the box” approach; 
2.	 be independent, verifiable, and based on robust 
methodology;239 
3.	 consider not only the benefits, but also the costs of the 
new technology or regulation;
238. The signaling effect is particularly important in the FinTech space since start­
ups and SMEs are not used to engaging in an ongoing relationship with the regulator and 
often prefer to “stay under the radar.” See supra Section V.B.3.c.2.
239. For concrete examples of challenges in calculating economic impact, see Hiroshi
Nakaso, Deputy Governor of the Bank of Japan, Remarks at the University of Tokyo–Bank of















    








   
 
   
   
 
  









4. ideally be performed on an ex ante and ex post basis. 
In addition, such assessment should take into account the rule of law
considerations. Perception of compliance (i.e. the expectation that the new 
rules will be complied with) is an important factor in calculating prospective 
economic benefit, as the benefits of a new regulation in a jurisdiction where
rules are generally ignored may be negligible or non-existent. Similarly,
on an ex post basis, the calculations should reflect not only the quantification
of actual benefits, but also the actual level of compliance with the relevant
rules. 
	 If certain categories of FinTech businesses are deemed to 
require preferential regulatory treatment (e.g. in cases of
insufficient domestic demand to develop the new technology),
the key rule of law principles should be observed. The 
corresponding rules should be clear and preclude regulatory 
arbitrariness.
	 FinTech sandboxes should be designed with clear policy 
objectives and rule of law principles. The rule of law 
considerations should include the following:
1.	 the selection criteria and methodology should be as clear 
and certain as possible; 
2.	 the outcomes of the applications should be made public, 
subject to any confidentiality requests by applicants; 
3.	 regulatory arbitrariness should be minimized: if selected 
businesses are perceived as having gained an unfair
regulatory advantage not based on objective selection 
criteria, the sandbox regime may lose its attractiveness 
among FinTech firms; 
4.	 the extent of preferential treatment towards the sandboxed
businesses should be limited and defined by the law. 
The following questions illustrate some of the underlying policy questions
that should be addressed. In all, this Article proposes six questions. First,
should the degree of novelty and the strength of the business model proposed
in the sandbox application be the only or main selection criterion?240 
Second, is it relevant for selection purpose that the applicant (i) is an
incumbent financial institution, (ii) is affiliated with an incumbent financial 
institution, (iii) is part of a FinTech incubator, or (iv) possesses other
 240. See, e.g., Financial Technology Regulatory Sandbox Framework, BANK NEGARA
MALAYSIA 4–5 (Oct. 18, 2016), https://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=57&pg=137&ac=533
&bb=file [https://perma.cc/R7U3-252L] (describing the eligibility criteria established by
the Malaysian regulator).
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resources unavailable to the other applicants? How does this affect the
outcome and how does one compare the different factual circumstances
of the applicants?241 Third, how relevant for the selection process is the
regulator’s own interest in exploring a particular technology? Fourth, how
can regulators prevent abuse of the sandboxing regime? Is it feasible to 
introduce a regime whereby selected business are required to pay to participate
in the sandbox (with waivers for some businesses, e.g. start-ups)? Fifth, 
are sandboxes designed to reduce the costs of compliance for selected
businesses? If not, what is the benefit of a sandbox for a start-up FinTech
company? Finally, does the sandboxing regime offer any spill-over benefits 
for the FinTech sector as a whole (e.g. in the form of publication of post-
selection reports by the regulators and comments on the lessons learned
from each sandbox project)? 
	 Regulators should consider introducing a principles-based
approach in the regulation of FinTech to achieve three things: 
(1) to address matters which should be regulated regardless 
of the type of technology applied, whether present or future 
(possible areas include the basic principles of end user protection,
such as prohibition of fraud); (2) to ensure continuity of the 
main principles of FinTech regulation in case of development 
of new, unforeseen, technologies; and/or (3) as an interim
measure designed to preserve the fundamental basics of FinTech
regulation until detailed rules-based provisions are developed.
	 Regulators should aim to actively engage with the FinTech
industry, despite its dispersed and decentralized nature. 
Depending on their priorities, regulators can wait for the 
industry to organize itself or adopt a pro-active approach to 
assist start-ups and SMEs in building their representative 
capacity. Since industry consolidation across the whole FinTech
area is problematic, product or technology-based consolidation 
appears preferable, at least initially.
241. In a similar manner, the eligibility criteria established by the FCA for its 
regulatory sandbox refer to “a genuine need” to test the innovation, and the applicant’s 
chances of becoming eligible for the sandbox are reduced if it “is able to undertake the test
easily without the support of the FCA.” Sandbox Eligibility Criteria, FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., 
https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/documents/sandbox-eligibility-criteria.pdf  [https://perma.cc/
Z6ZX-K9SW] (last visited Feb. 16, 2018). 
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	 Domestic, and wherever feasible, international regulatory
coordination should be improved. Regulatory competition 
should be avoided by eliminating overlaps in the corresponding 
mandates. Regulatory cooperation can be further enhanced
by establishing product or technology-specific working groups 
including representatives from all the relevant regulators. 
	 Regulators may consider introducing special rules applicable 
to FinTech businesses that have a systemic importance for 
the economy due to the possibility of rapid growth exhibited 
by some FinTech companies.242 At the same time, the criteria
for identifying systemically important businesses should be
clear and explicit, minimizing the opportunity for regulatory
arbitrariness.
	 While the development of dedicated FinTech regulation may
take time, it is important to prioritize preventing the negative 
effects of new technologies, such as cybercrime. 
VIII. CONCLUSION
Regulation of FinTech as a financial, but, more importantly, legal concept
raises a wide range of difficulties, from defining the term itself to overcoming 
the “holdout start-up” problems. Adequate FinTech regulation is unlikely
without a clearly defined overarching regulatory strategy and a set of priorities 
acting as policy beacons. While the regulatory response to FinTech differs 
from state to state, the challenges associated with the broad concept of 
“rule of law” (such as the need for legal certainty and prevention of unequal
treatment) appear universally relevant, regardless of the selected FinTech
policy.
The unique features of FinTech are getting increased attention from 
regulators across the globe, which often aim to better understand the new 
technology and its potential benefits, while also occasionally attempting 
to engage in international collaboration with the other regulators. Nonetheless,
the regulatory response to FinTech is predominantly contained in domestic 
laws: full scale international cooperation in this field remains a distant 
opportunity.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, FinTech shows a lot of promise. The potential 
for financial inclusion and the absence of major crises resulting from the
new technologies ensure an overall pro-FinTech sentiment. Kenya and 
242.  Sections 29–31 of the new Financial Sector Regulation Act in South Africa
introduce a special regime for “systemically important financial institutions.” Financial 
Sector Regulation Act 2017, GN 853 of GG 41060 (Aug. 22, 2017). It remains to be seen, 
however, whether this regime is broad enough to cover all FinTech businesses. 
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South Africa, as the FinTech leaders in Sub-Saharan Africa, do not have
an overarching FinTech-specific legal framework and address various
issues as they emerge. In doing so, they often struggle with the fast-paced
developments in technology, but occasionally attempt future-oriented
measures (such as risk warnings concerning the use of certain new 
technologies). 
The notable developments in FinTech regulation in the two jurisdictions 
include the new system of social and economic impact analysis in South 
Africa and the new sandbox regulatory framework in Kenya. If utilized 
properly, the former can provide a solid basis for setting regulatory priorities 
among various FinTech solutions. The latter has the potential to establish 
a win-win collaboration between the regulators and the regulated: authorities 
gain a better understanding of the new technology and the businesses have 
peace of mind while operating in a safe and controlled legal environment.
Principles-based regulation is seen as a particularly attractive method of 
regulating such a complex and heterogeneous concept as FinTech. In the
short term, however, regulators attempt to address the more pressing issues, 
such as cybercrime, via new legislative initiatives. 
A deeper look into the regulation of FinTech developments, like
cryptocurrencies or crowdfunding, might be warranted in the near future, 
as the regulators in both jurisdictions further develop their legal frameworks. 
Similarly, it would be useful to see what kind of regulatory response to
FinTech will be adopted by other countries in the region and perform a 
comparative analysis. However, such analysis is beyond the scope of this 
Article and deserves a separate study. 
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